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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of District of Columbia v. Heller1 and McDonald v. City of Chicago2 
there have been numerous legal challenges to extend the Second Amendment outside 
the home.  The challenges come in all forms.  Some advocates rely on Heller’s dicta 
to claim handguns provide the quintessential self-defense weapon outside the home.3  
Other’s take a balancing of liberty approach to claim any threats to the liberty, 
security, and property of a person know no bounds, and may be preserved with the 
public carrying of arms.4  Lastly, some challenges invoke First Amendment 
jurisprudence to assert that any prior restraints on armed individual self-defense are 
unconstitutional, unless the government can show a compelling or substantial 
government interest for doing so.5   
In terms of historiography, what makes these challenges interesting is they are a 
complete reversal from the Standard Model stance nearly three decades earlier.  
Writing in 1983, Don B. Kates determined the Second Amendment did not protect 
the right to carry guns outside the home, unless “in the course of militia service.”6  
                                                          
 
1
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 
2
 McDonald v Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 
3
 See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 465 (4th Cir. 2011); Williams v. State, 
10 A.3d 1167, 1171 (Md. 2011); see also DiGiacinto v. Rector and Visitors of George Mason 
University, 704 S.E.2d 365 (Va. 2011). 
 
4
 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary and/or Permanent 
Injunction, Shepard v. Madigan, No. 3:11-cv-00405, at 5 (S.D. Ill. 2011).  For scholarly 
approaches making similar lines of argument, see Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009); Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost, 34 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 951 (2011). 
 
5
 For an interesting case on this subject, see GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. 
Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Ga. 2011).  For the continued push to import First Amendment 
jurisprudence into the Second Amendment, see Ezell v. Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697, 699-701 
(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 
6
 Don B. Kates Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 267 (1983).  Three years later, Kates would retract this 
statement in light of Stephen P. Halbrook’s research.  See Don B. Kates Jr., The Second 
Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 149 (1986).  To date, Halbrook’s 
research has yet to provide any substantiated evidence that a right to armed individual self-
defense extends outside the home, either through the common law or Second Amendment.  
Halbrook makes numerous historical assumptions to this point, but does so without adequate 
historical evidence.  See infra notes 18 and 278 for discussion.  Furthermore, the findings in 
this article dispel any of Halbrook’s historical assumptions. 
Also, in 1992, Kates wrote a short article claiming the founding generation saw no difference 
in individual armed self-defense and rebelling against tyranny.  See Don B. Kates Jr., The 
Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMM. 87 (1992).  A close 
reading of the Kates’ sources and placing them in historical context does not support this 
conclusion, particularly his discussion on William Blackstone’s fifth auxiliary right and the 
founding generation’s articulation of Blackstone.  Compare Patrick J. Charles, The Right of 
Self-Preservation and Resistance: A True Legal and Historical Understanding of the Anglo-
American Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 18, 24-60 (2010) (tracing the 
intellectual origins of Blackstone’s fifty auxiliary right and discussing its limits in Anglo-
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“Outside that context,” wrote Kates, “the only carrying of firearms which the 
amendment appears to protect is such transportation as is implicit in the concept of a 
right to possess—e.g., transporting them between the purchaser or owner’s premises 
and a shooting range, or a gun store or gunsmith and so on.”7 
Today, however, the view of the Second Amendment has drastically changed. 
Following the opinions in Heller and McDonald, advocacy groups are pushing for 
robust Second Amendment rights outside the home.  This includes rights to open 
carry, conceal carry, and even a revisionist libertarian spin of William Blackstone’s 
analysis on auxiliary rights.8  Needless to say, the Second Amendment is continuing 
to morph further into mythical meaning, and farther away from any historical 
context.9 
                                                          
American constitutionalism), with Kates, The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-
Protection, supra, at 90-104.   
 
7
 Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra note 6, at 267; see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A 
Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 482 (1995) (supporting 
Kate’s initial interpretation). 
 
8
 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary and/or Permanent 
Injunction supra note 4, at 5 (claiming the Second Amendment extends “to carrying arms for 
protection against violence in public.  This is apparent from Blackstone’s discussion of the 
right to arms.  Blackstone classified the right of British subjects ‘of having arms for their 
defence’ as among ‘auxiliary’ rights ‘which serve principally as barriers to protect and 
maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, 
and private property.’”); City Club Podcast: Alan Gura, Esq., speaks about the District of 
Columbia v. Heller case, and Second Amendment rights and the Firearms Control Regulation 
Act, THE CITY CLUB OF CLEVELAND (July 7, 2008) (“The right to arms was well established . . 
. from Blackstone’s conception of a right of self-preservation. If you have the right to preserve 
your own life, Blackstone reasoned, you have an auxiliary right to arms with which you would 
do so, and that is what the English law protected, and that is the right the English king started 
to encroach upon . . . and it is very well documented.”).  This interpretation of Blackstone is 
severally flawed in terms of textual interpretation and historical context.  See Charles, The 
Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance, supra note 6, at 34-36. 
 
9
 The historical underpinnings of District of Columbia v. Heller are not built upon a solid 
foundation.  For the problems with Heller’s Anglo origins analysis, compare Patrick J. 
Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of the 
English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351 (2009), with JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, 
TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994).  Lois G. 
Schwoerer was the first historian to point out the problems with this line of historical thinking 
and refute Joyce Lee Malcolm’s thesis.  See Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The 
English Perspective, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY: HISTORIANS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS ON THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 207–21 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000).  
For the problems with Heller’s American origins analysis, compare PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME 
COURT (2009), with STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS 
OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (2008).  Despite the historical problems, one could reconcile the 
holding in Heller—self-defense in the home with a handgun—in one of two ways.  The first is 
through a living or popular constitution analysis.  See Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism 
and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 594-98 (2011); Joseph Blocher, Popular 
Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys General, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 108 (2011).  The 
other is through an extension of the English common law and castle doctrine.  See 1 WILLIAM 
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 136, ch. 63, § 8 (1716). 
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How is this being accomplished?  One answer is revisionist history.  This occurs 
in all areas of constitutional law from the First Amendment10 to congressional power 
over immigration,11 and is not limited to the Second Amendment.12  Revisionism 
surfaces as a means for individuals, advocacy groups, public interest groups and 
even politicians to advance an agenda through the courts rather than adopt legislation 
or constitutional reform.  In short, revisionist history is a reeducation of the public to 
believe a historical fiction was in fact a historical reality.13 
In terms of the right to “keep and bear arms” in public places, this means 
diminishing the founding generation’s understanding of the police power to only a 
few minor exceptions.14  The founders are recast as a gun-toting civil society where 
every individual’s life is portrayed as more constitutionally significant or equal to 
                                                          
 
10
 Compare Patrick J. Charles & Kevin O’Neill, Saving the Press Clause From Ruin: The 
Customary Origins of a “Free Press” as Interface to the Present and Future, 2012 UTAH L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012) (tracing the historical origins of the press clause through custom and 
intellectual thought), with Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the 
Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 459 (2011) 
(defining the Press Clause as a technology guarantee despite only one print technology being 
available in the eighteenth century). 
 
11
 Compare Patrick J. Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of 
Ideological Exclusion, 15 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 61 (2010) (addressing the international and 
Anglo origins over immigration and its imprint on American constitutionalism), with James E. 
Pfander and Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of The Early 
Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359 (2010) 
(ahistorically claiming the immigration power was limited to norms of prospectively). 
 
12
 See supra note 9. 
 
13
 Constitutional revisionism is nothing new in the pantheons of history.  See J.G.A. 
POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (New York, A.S. Barnes & Co. 
1957) (discussing the use of history and contemporary understandings of the common law to 
mold constitutional interpretation); see also Henry Reed, American Constitution in 1787 and 
1866, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 604, 619 (1875) (“Every man has a theory of 
government under which he lives, and sees it through the medium of his theory.  With the 
government, as seen through this medium, he is either satisfied or dissatisfied. If the former, 
he is inclined to attribute to its agency a large share of the prosperity and happiness which the 
people have enjoyed; if the latter, he is equally liberal in charging upon it the adversity and 
unhappiness they have experienced. In fact, the country appears to these observers to be 
fortunate or otherwise, and our history and progress respectable or otherwise, accordingly as 
the government is in conformity or otherwise with their respective theories.  With the one, the 
desire is that the government shall remain as it was created, and the Constitution be 
interpreted in accordance with recognized canons of legal interpretation; with the other, it is 
that the Constitution shall be interpreted to agree with his ideas of political expediency, and 
the government be made to conform to the interpretation.”). 
 
14
 See Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms 
in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139 
(2007).  In addition to this article refuting this historical assumption, Churchill’s thesis has 
already been sufficiently challenged as outside the bounds of eighteenth century historical 
reality.  See Saul Cornell, Early American Gun Regulation and the Second Amendment: A 
Closer Look at the Evidence, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 197 (2007) (rebutting Churchill’s thesis); 
David Thomas Konig, Arms and the Man: What Did the Right to “Keep” Arms Mean in the 
Early Republic?, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 177 (2007). 
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society’s interest in preserving the peace and ensuring the public good.15  In other 
words, it is being asserted that an armed society facilitates the peace as much as a 
well-regulated government or society.16  While this mythical Second Amendment 
has garnered acceptance among some of the masses, politicians, and gun advocates, 
the historical evidence does not support this conclusion.  Indeed, the founding 
generation saw a great importance for arms bearing in the advancement of the Early 
Republic, but not in the manner it is cast by gun proponents.17 
Another way the Second Amendment is being recast is through inventive legal 
strategies.  Those that advocate for a robust Second Amendment outside the home 
seek solace in libertarian doctrine and First Amendment jurisprudence.  These 
approaches wish to cast aside history as inconclusive, and claim armed individual 
self-defense as equally fundamental in time, place, and manner as other 
constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech or religion.18  In particular, it is 
                                                          
 
15
 See HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 9, at 20, 98, 108, 
137, 158. 
 
16
 A well-regulated government or society was the entire theory behind republican 
government and embodied in the Declaration of Independence.  See Patrick J. Charles, 
Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in Our Constitutional Jurisprudence: 
An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 457, 505-11 (2011). 
 
17
 This holds particularly true in terms of the “well-regulated militia” right to “keep and 
bear arms.”  See generally Patrick J. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-
Regulated” Militia Asserted and Proven With Commentary on the Future of Second 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 3 NE. U. L.J. 1 (2011); Patrick J. Charles, The 1792 National 
Militia Act, the Second Amendment, and Individual Militia Rights: A Legal and Historical 
Perspective, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323 (2011).  For some ahistorical positions that an 
armed populace equates to a “well-regulated militia,” see Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George 
Tucker’s Second Amendment: Deconstructing “The True Palladium of Liberty”, 3 TENN. J.L. 
& POL’Y 120, 130 (2007) (“the Second Amendment was prompted by the perceived need to 
protect the right of individuals to keep and bear arms, which would encourage a well-
regulated militia”); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF 
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 61-65, 85 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that the Second Amendment 
should be interpreted to read that because a “well-organized militia is necessary to security of 
a free State” that the people should be armed); id. at 144 (“Recognition of the right of the 
people to have arms promoted a well-regulated militia.”); David T. Hardy, Ducking the Bullet: 
District of Columbia v. Heller and the Stevens Dissent, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 61, 
67 n.32 (2010) (stating that the Founding Fathers never defined a well-regulated militia and 
understood it to require that the people at large be “properly armed and equipped”); 
HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 9, at 181-83 (asserting the myth 
that “the people at large” have a right to “keep and bear arms” separate from the federal and 
State governments because an “armed citizenry” had demonstrated “success” in the American 
Revolution). 
 
18
 Some appellate courts have embraced portions of this liberty balancing.  See Ezell v. 
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (although paying lip service to history, adopting facets 
of First Amendment jurisprudence when analyzing the Second Amendment); United States v. 
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (recognizing facets of First Amendment 
jurisprudence for importation to the Second Amendment),  For scholarly approaches, see 
Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense, supra note 4, at 
1516-33; Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost, supra note 5, at 1042. 
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argued that the Second Amendment has finally been recognized as fundamental, and 
the courts must begin jurisprudence anew to reflect this fact.19 
This article disagrees that the courts need to reinvent or recast the Second 
Amendment outside the home to reflect its “fundamental” status as recognized in 
Heller and McDonald.  The history of public arms regulation already provides 
significant guideposts for the courts to adjudicate the right to “keep and bear arms” 
in public.20  To accomplish this, it requires placing history in context and not letting 
mythical interpretations or historical assumptions to permeate.   
Thus, this article begins by decoding the public carrying of arms as the founding 
generation would have understood it.21  It provides substantiating historical evidence 
that counters the mythical meanings of the Statute of Northampton,22 and proves that 
the Statute did not solely seek to regulate a particular conduct with the intent to 
terrify, but the activity of carrying arms among the public concourse.  It was the act 
of carrying arms itself that was deemed to terrify the people, for it was thought to be 
uncommon and unsafe to go armed in a well-regulated society.  Such conduct ran 
counter to the idea of government authority and the police power.23 
In addition to this showing, this article weighs the historical approach against 
others, particularly libertarian balancing and the importation of First Amendment 
jurisprudence into the Second.24  To apply either of these latter approaches would be 
unprecedented in the pantheons of arms regulation history and American 
jurisprudence altogether.  Not once did the founding generation conflate public arms 
                                                          
 
19
 See Robert A. Levy, Second Amendment Redux: Scrutiny, Incorporation, and the Heller 
Paradox, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 208 (2010); Blackman, The Constitutionality of 
Social Cost, supra note 4, at 1042. 
 
20
 See Patrick J. Charles, Scribble Scrabble, the Second Amendment, and Historical 
Guideposts: A Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Malcolm, 105 NW. L.REV. 
COLLOQUY. 227, 237-42 (2011). 
 
21
 This requires identifying longstanding historical restrictions on the “keeping” or 
“bearing” of arms circa 1791 or a longstanding political or philosophical ideology for 
regulating or restricting the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms circa 1791, not finding an exact 
historical parallel.  See Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After 
McDonald: “Historical Guideposts” and the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 7, 21-30 (2010). 
 
22
 See infra Part II. 
 
23
 See infra Part II. 
 
24
 Certainly, it remains unclear as to what standard of review the Supreme Court will 
apply in such instances.  See Nelson Lund, Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (Or Are There 
More?) in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 63 FLA. L. REV. 487, 501-5 (2011) (discussing the 
difficulty in determining what constitutes a “sensitive place”).  For a categorical analysis of 
First and Second Amendment jurisprudence, see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and 
Balancing the First and Second Amendments, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009).  For some other 
commentary comparing the First and Second Amendments, see William Van Alstyne, The 
Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Darrell A.H.  
Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1278 (2009). 
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carrying with a presumption of liberty or prior restraint.25  Instead, arms regulation 
was premised on what was in the interest of the public good.26 
II.  THE STATUTE OF NORTHAMPTON AS A GUIDEPOST TO ANALYZING THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT OUTSIDE THE HOME 
It is no secret that both Heller and McDonald reflect originalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation.27  Given this fact, it makes little sense to completely 
cast off history in determining the protective scope of the Second Amendment 
outside the home.28  As Justice Scalia stated in McDonald, the “traditional 
restrictions [on arms] go to show the scope of the right” just as history helps to 
define “other rights.”29 While Scalia conceded that conducting “historical analysis 
can be difficult,” he recognized history to be “the best means available in an 
imperfect world.”30  He elaborated:   
In the most controversial matters brought before this Court . . . any 
historical methodology, under any plausible standard of proof, would lead 
to the same conclusion. Moreover, the methodological differences that 
divide historians, and the varying interpretative assumptions they bring to 
their work, are nothing compared to the differences among the American 
people . . . .31 
This begets the question, “What historical support is there for the regulation of arms 
in public?” The answer is the public regulation of arms is as old as the Norman 
Conquest32 or what eighteenth century commentators referred to as the beginning of 
                                                          
 
25
 The doctrine of prior restraint has a long history in the intellectual origins of a free 
press.  See Charles and O’Neill, Saving the Press Clause from Ruin, supra note 10.  However, 
no legal scholar or historian has found any substantiated evidence that the Second Amendment 
was viewed in a similar light. 
 
26
 Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 20, at 231-36. 
 
27
 For some critiques on this point, see Bret Boyce, Heller, McDonald and Originalism, 
2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 2 (2010); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 
OHIO ST. L.J. 609 (2008). 
 
28
 Many courts have agreed with this approach, albeit with little effect.  See  United States 
v. Rene, 583 F.3d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808-09 (7th 
Cir. 2009), aff’d, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. July 13, 2010), vacated, reh’g en banc, No. 08-3770, 
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6584 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010); United States v. Brown, 715 F. Supp. 
2d 688 (E.D. Va. 2010); United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D. W. Va. 2010); 
United States v. Walker, 709 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Va. 2010); see also Darrell Miller, What 
the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second (forthcoming 2011); Charles, The 
Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald, supra note 1. 
 
29
 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3056 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 
30
 Id. at 3057-58. 
 
31
 Id. at 3058 (internal citations omitted). 
 
32
 THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 69, 81 (F.L. Attenborough ed. & trans., 
1922). 
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the English Constitution.33  It was a subject that was often dependent upon socio-
economic status and in the interests of the public good.34  The most significant 
regulation on this subject is the 1328 Statute of Northampton.  It stipulated that no 
person shall “go nor ride armed by Night nor by Day in Fairs, Markets, nor in the 
Presence of the Justices or other Ministers nor in no Part elsewhere,”35 and was a 
staple in the American legal system before and after the adoption of the 
Constitution.36 
A textual reading of the Statute supports a broad prohibition on the public 
carrying of arms to prevent public injury, crime, and breaches of the peace.37  Thus, 
in terms of our Anglo-American legal tradition, it may be asserted that the Second 
Amendment was not viewed as extending outside the home, and if it did at all, it 
only provided minimal protection.  In contrast, a number of Second Amendment 
commentators claim the Statute of Northampton cannot be interpreted in this light.  
For instance, David B. Kopel and Clayton Cramer claim the Statute requires “arms 
carrying with the specific intent of terrorizing the public.”38  David T. Hardy 
similarly deduces the Statute stands for the punishment of dangerous conduct, not 
the act itself.  He believes the “key to the offense was not so much the nature of the 
arm, as the specific intent to cause terror.”39  Also, Eugene Volokh claims the Statute 
must be understood “as covering only those circumstances where carrying of arms 
was unusual and therefore terrifying.”40  Quoting William Hawkins’ Pleas of the 
Crown, Volokh asserts the Statute solely stands for the legal proposition that “public 
carrying ‘accompanied with such circumstances as are apt to terrify the people’ was . 
                                                          
 
33
 JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND; OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
ENGLISH GOVERNMENT; IN WHICH IT IS COMPARED BOTH WITH THE REPUBLICAN FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT, AND THE OTHER MONARCHIES IN EUROPE 7-15 (London, T. Spilsbury, new ed. 
1775). 
 
34
 See Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence?”, supra note 9, at 358, 363-65. 
 
35
 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.); see also 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.) (if “any 
Man of this Realm ride armed covertly or secretly with Men of Arms against any other . . . 
shall be judged Treason.”); 1 Jac.1, c. 8 (1603-4) (Eng.) (also known as the Statute of 
Stabbing). 
 
36
 Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 20, at 231-36. 
 
37
 This textual reading is affirmed by a subsequent statute amending and enforcing it.  See 
20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.) (“no Lord, Knight, or other, little nor great, shall go nor ride 
by Night nor by Day armed . . . save and except the King’s Officers and Ministers in doing 
their Office.”); see also GEORGE CRABB, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW; OR AN ATTEMPT TO 
TRACE THE RISE PROGRESS, AND SUCCESSIVE CHANGES OF THE COMMON LAW FROM THE 
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 335-36 (Burlington, Chevney Godrich 1831) 
(interpreting the statute according to its text). 
 
38
 David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Standards of Review for the Right to the Keep 
and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1127 (2010)  (emphasis added) (discussing 
State v. Huntly, 3 Ired. 418 (N.C. 1843));  see also Kopel & Cramer, supra, at 1133-34. 
 
39
 David T. Hardy, District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago: The 
Present as Interface of the Past and Future, 3 NE. U. L.J. 199, 205 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 
40
 Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 
101 (2009). 
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. . seen as prohibited,” but “‘wearing common weapons’ in ‘the common fashion’ 
was legal.”41 
It is interesting that each of these commentators claim their interpretation to be 
rooted in history, yet not one sought to delve into the historical record.  It is what the 
legal academy refers to as faux orignalism,42 for each of these commentators make 
false assumptions as to what behavior the Statute of Northampton sought to prevent.  
This ad hoc historical inquiry is insufficient at any academic level, for many 
questions are still left unanswered such as legislative intent, legal interpretation, and 
the public understanding of its tenets.  The only way to truly understand the Statute’s 
regulatory scope is to delve into its Anglo origins and trace it through mid-
nineteenth century America.  As John Marshall aptly put it: 
Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to construction. Where the mind 
labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from 
which aid can be derived; and in such case the title claims a degree of 
notice, and will have its due share of consideration.43 
Unsurprisingly, Marshall was not the only prominent eighteenth century legal 
mind to deduce statutory interpretation from the collective whole.  Josiah Quincy 
Junior, a prominent Boston attorney during the American Revolution, deduced a 
similar conclusion: 
1st That it the most natural and genuine Exposition of a Statute to 
Construe one Part of the Statute by another Part of the same Statute, for 
that best expresseth the Meaning of the Makers. 2dly The words of an Act 
of Parliament must be taken in a lawful [and] rightfull Sense . . . 3dly 
That Construction must be made of a Statute in Suppression of the 
Mischief, [and] in Advancement of the Remedy.44 
It is from this talking point that Quincy elaborated on statutory interpretation and 
the importance of assembling the whole to include text, legislative intent, the spirit 
of the law, and history: 
                                                          
 
41
 Id. at 102 (quoting 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 
supra note 10, at 136, ch. 63, § 9). 
 
42
 Steven G. Calebresi was the first to coin “faux originalism” to describe false notions of 
history.  See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, 
and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 646, 647, 651 (2006).  However, the phrase has become most 
associated with Judge Richard Posner’s critique of District of Columbia v. Heller.  See 
Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32-33;  see also Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes, 
the Second Amendment, and Originalist Methodology: A Critical Comment, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 406, 409 (2008); Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of 
History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 631 (2008); Saul Cornell, 
Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old 
Boss”, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2009); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1551, 1559-65 (2009). 
 
43
 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805). 
 
44
 2 THE MAJOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PAPERS OF JOSIAH QUINCY JUNIOR 219 (Daniel R. 
Coquillette and Neil Longley York eds., 2007). 
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The fairest [and] most rational method to interpret the will of the 
legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was 
made; by signs of the most natural [and] probable. And these signs are 
either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects [and] 
consequence, or the spirit [and] reason of the law . . . The true key for 
construing a statute is to consider the subject matter of it, and the ends and 
purposes for which it was made. But perhaps this may be better done from 
the history [and] circumstances of the times, than [from the bowels] of the 
statute . . . The words of the statutes are not only to be considered, but 
rather the intent of the makers is to be weighed; for the intent is the 
principle thing to be considered.45 
Thus, if we are to proceed to understand the founding generation’s view of the 
Statute of Northampton in legal terms, many questions must be answered.  First, is 
the intent of the Statute “plain” or does the “mind labour to discover the design of 
the legislature”?  Clearly, the Statute of Northampton contained no intent 
requirement for the conduct of going armed to be otherwise unlawful.46  One merely 
had to go or ride armed in “Fairs, Markets,” or other populated enclaves.  The same 
was true for the 1285 statute of Edward I, which made it unlawful to go or wander 
“about the Streets” of London, “after Curfew tolled . . . with Sword or Buckler, or 
other Arms for doing Mischief . . . nor any in any other Manner, unless he be a great 
Man or other lawful Person of good repute[.]”47  It was not until 1350 that there was 
a “going armed” statute with an intent requirement.  This statute neither amended 
nor overrode the Statute of Northampton.  It merely stipulated that it was a separate 
felony for “any Man of this Realm ride armed covertly or secretly with Men of Arms 
against any other.”48    
Given these historical facts, it is hard to deduce how some may claim the Statute 
of Northampton is to be read with a particularized terrifying conduct requirement. 
Nevertheless, if one is to fully appreciate the Statute’s legislative purpose a deeper 
historical inquiry is required in accordance with Quincy’s viewpoint, which brings 
us to a second set of questions.49  What was the Statute’s common understanding 
from its inception?   What was the reason for the Statute and where there any legal 
exceptions to the standard rule?  Did the early American perception of the law 
deviate at all from this understanding?  What evidence, if any, is there for this 
conclusion?  Did the Second Amendment and contemporaneous state provisions 
seek to override the Statute of Northampton? 
                                                          
 
45
 Id. at 225. 
 
46
 See 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.); 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.). 
 
47
 13 Edw. 1 (1285) (Eng.) (Statutes for the City of London) (emphasis added). 
 
48
 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.).  The differentiation between the 1350 statute 
and the Statute of Northampton is supported by Coke’s Institutes.  See EDWARD COKE, THE 
THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND 
OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 160 (E&R Brooke et. al. eds., London, 
1797) (showing the “clau[s]e of the [s]tatute 25 E. 3” was a treason distinction). 
 
49
 See Carlton F.W. Lawson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia 
v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1378-79 (2009) (questioning whether 
the Statute of Northampton was ever enforced and whether it was prevalent in American 
jurisprudence after the Constitution). 
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The answers to this second set of questions requires more than textual word play 
and misconceptions of the law from centuries prior or what is referred to as faux 
originalism.  Instead, it requires the use of accepted historical methodologies to 
deduce original or public meaning.   
A.  The Original Meaning of the Statute of Northampton through the Sixteenth 
Century 
In 1716, William Hawkins wrote that the offense of going or riding armed had 
always been an offense under the common law.50  To date, no historian or originalist 
has provided evidence to support the position that the offense preceded the Statute of 
Northampton.  Certainly, the Parliament of Edward I made it unlawful for most 
persons to go armed at night in the City of London,51 yet it may be asserted that this 
statute merely provides another example of public arms regulation, and is not an 
affirmation of any common law authority.  Not surprisingly, the counterpoise to this 
assertion lies in the English archives, for its contents affirm the offense of “going 
armed” was prohibited by the prerogative power before being codified as the Statute 
of Northampton. 
The first such recorded instance appears to have occurred in the mid-thirteenth 
century.52  The practice then carried into the latter half of the century when Edward I 
instructed the sheriffs of Salop and Stafford to prohibit anyone from “going armed 
within the realm without the king’s special licence.”53  From this date, proclamations 
against going armed to prevent possible affrays became quite regular, particularly 
during the assembly of people at tournaments.54  An exception being in 1302, when 
Edward I instructed the sheriff of Warwick to arrest “any knight, esquire or any other 
person” that went armed until the Westminster Parliament convened.55   
                                                          
 
50
 HAWKINS, supra note 9, at 136, ch. 63, § 4. 
 
51
 13 Edw. 1 (1285) (Eng.) (Statutes for the City of London). 
 
52
 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 583 (1895) (“[B]efore the end of Henry III’s reign there were 
oridances which commanded the arrest of suspicious persons who went about armed without 
lawful cause.”). 
 
53
 4 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD I, 1296-1302 318 (September 15, 1299, 
Canterbury) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., London, Mackie And Co. 1906). 
 
54
 4 THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTY OF LEICESTER: THE CITY OF LEICESTER 1-30 (R.A. 
McKinley ed., 1958). 
 
55
 4 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD I, supra note 53, at 583 (June 13, 1302, 
Cartham);  see also id. at 588 (July 16, 1302, Westminster) (“To the sheriff of York.  Order to 
cause proclamation to be made throughout his bailiwick prohibiting any knight, esquire or any 
other person from tourneying, tilting . . . making jousts, seeking adventures or otherwise going 
armed without the king’s special licence, and to cause to be arrested the horses and armour of 
any persons found thus going with arms after proclamation.”); 5 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE 
ROLLS, EDWARD I, 1302-1307 210 (June 10, 1304, Stirling)  (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., London, 
Mackie And Co. 1908) (“To the sheriff of Leicester.  Order to cause proclamation to be made 
immediately upon sight of this order prohibiting any knight, esquire or other person from 
tourneying, tilting . . . making jousts, seeking adventures, or otherwise going armed in any 
way without the king’s licence.”); id. at 535-36 (June 12, 1307, Carlisle) (“To the sheriff of 
Essex . . . all persons assembling there, under penalty of forfeiting all that they can forfeit to 
 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
12 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1 
 
On numerous occasions Edward II issued similar proclamations to ensure 
political stability.  In 1308, Dover was ordered to enforce the prohibition that “no 
knight, esquire, or other shall, under pain of forfeiture . . . go armed at Croydon or 
elsewhere before the king’s coronation.”56  In 1310, the sheriff of York was ordered 
to prohibit any “earl, baron, knight, or other” from going armed.57  Meanwhile, in 
1312, Edward II ordered the sheriffs of Warwick and Leicester to seize the weapons 
of any that “go armed . . . without the king’s special licence . . . .”58 
These examples provide ample historical evidence of the government’s 
prerogative in prohibiting the people from going publicly armed to ensure the peace.  
What remains unclear is whether these prohibitions were only enforced during times 
of suspected affray, thus preventing the people from being armed for only short 
periods of time, or whether the power to prohibit going armed was inherent with the 
local constable or sheriff’s authority, and the proclamations served as reminders of 
the status quo.  The evidence available at the turn of the fourteenth century does not 
provide a clear affirmation, but there is nothing in the historical record to suggest 
that the local authorities were prohibited from disarming individuals among the 
public concourse to ensure the public safety. 
What the record does unequivocally reveal is that Edward II issued a 
proclamation that served as the precursor to the Statute of Northampton.  On April 
28, 1326, the proclamation was one of a series of attempts to provide uniform order 
and justice throughout the kingdom.  The following was relayed to the sheriff of 
Huntington: 
Whereas the king lately caused by proclamation to be made throughout 
his realm prohibiting any one going armed without his licence, except the 
keepers of his peace, sheriffs, and other ministers, willing that any one 
doing the contrary should be taken by the sheriff or bailiffs or the keepers 
of his peace and delivered to the nearest gaols . . . the king now learns that 
Thomas de Eye, John Grubbe, and Richard le Orfreysier . . . with aketons, 
bacinets, and other arms by day and by night in towns, fairs, markets, and 
other public and private places, committing many evil deeds, contrary to 
the proclamation and inhibition aforesaid . . . . 59 
                                                          
the king, of their making tournaments, jousts, or tilting . . . or of their going armed or seeking 
adventures otherwise there or elsewhere within the sheriff’s bailiwick.”). 
 
56
 1 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD II, 1307-1313 52 (February 9, 1308, Dover) 
(H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., London, Mackie And Co.1892). 
 
57
 Id. at 257 (March 20, 1310, Berwick-on-Tweed). 
 
58
 Id. at 553 (October 12, 1312, Windsor); see also id. at 269 (“To the sheriff of York.  
Order to proclaim the king’s prohibition of anyone making tournaments, bourds, jousts, 
seeking adventures, or going armed, under pain of forfeiture, until the king returns from 
Scotland.”). 
 
59
 4 CALENDAR OF CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD II, 1323-1327 560 (April 28, 1326, Kenilworth) 
(H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., London, Mackie And Co. 1898).  Edward II issued a similar 
proclamation a month earlier.  See id. at 549 (March 6, 1326, Leicester) (ordering the sheriff 
of York to arrest “any man hereafter [that] go armed on foot or horseback, within liberties or 
without”);  see also 1 CALENDAR OF  PLEA & MEMORANDA ROLLS OF THE CITY OF LONDON, 
1323-1364 15 (November 1326) (A.H. Thomas ed., 1926) (“[N]o man go armed by night or 
day, save officers and other good men of the City assigned by the Mayor and Aldermen in 
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While Edward II would end up fleeing in the midst of social and political 
turmoil,60 two years later Parliament would streamline the proclamation into the 
Statute of Northampton.61 The Statute was much more than a prohibition on arms in 
the public concourse.  Its tenets also provided the basis of English legal reform for 
centuries to come.62  The Statute sought to purge corruption within local 
government, unify the kingdom under a body of law, and ensure the public peace 
was kept.63   
In terms of public arms, the Statute’s prohibition not only mirrored Edward II’s 
proclamation, but was also the means to prevent breaches of the peace such as theft 
and robbery.64  In fact, it was the numerous complaints of crime and corruption to the 
House of Commons that brought the need for legal reform.65  One of those reforms 
was the prohibition of public arms to maintain justice, as well as prevent any 
overthrow of government at the local or national level.66  
In the years following, reminders were sent to the different sheriffs that the 
Statute of Northampton should be strictly enforced as prohibiting the act of “going 
armed,” not a particular conduct with the intent to terrify.  In 1328, the sheriff of 
Southampton was ordered “to cause the statute in the late parliament at Northampton 
prohibiting men coming armed before [the] justices or other ministers . . . or going 
armed, etc., to be observed in all its articles throughout the whole of [the] 
bailiwick[.]”67  In 1330, the sheriffs of Surrey and Sussex were informed to “take all 
those whom [they] shall find going armed, with their horses and armour . . . as the 
king understands that many are going about armed, in the sheriff’s bailiwick, 
contrary to the form of the statute made in the late parliament of Northampton.”68  In 
1332, the keepers and justices of Northumberland were reminded to arrest “all 
persons riding or going armed to disturb the peace, and to keep them safely in prison 
                                                          
their wards to keep watch and preserve the peace, under penalty of forfeiture of arms and 
imprisonment.”); id. (“The bearing of arms is forbidden, except to the officers of the City 
assigned by the Mayor and Alderman to keep watch in the Wards, and to the Hainaulters of 
the Queen, who are accustomed to go armed in the manner of their country.”). 
 
60
 For a history discussing this, see generally Claire Valente, The Deposition and 
Abdication of Edward II, 113  ENG. HIST. REV. 852 (1998). 
 
61
 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). 
 
62
 See Anthony Verduyn, The Politics of Law and Order During the Early Years of 
Edward III, 108 ENG. HIST. REV. 842, 850 (1993). 
 
63
 See Bertha Haven Putnam, The Transformation of the Keepers of the Peace into the 
Justices of the Peace, 12 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 19 (1929) (discussing the legal 
reforms to ensure the peace at the local level as the result of the Statute of Northampton). 
 
64
 Id. at 19-20. 
 
65
 Verduyn, supra note 62, at 848-49. 
 
66
 Id; see also W. R. Jones, Rex et ministry: English Local Government and the Crisis of 
1341, 13 J. BRIT. STUD. 1, 6 (1973). 
 
67
 1 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD III, 1327-1330 420 (November 10, 1328, 
Wallingford) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., London, Mackie And Co. 1896).  
 
68
 2 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD III, 1330-1333 131 (April 3, 1330, 
Woodstock) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., London, Mackie And Co.1898). 
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
14 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1 
 
. . . .”
69
  Similarly, in 1334, the mayor and bailiffs of York were reminded that “no 
one except a minister of the king should use armed force or go armed in fairs, 
markets, etc. under pain of loss of [his] arms and imprisonment[.]”70   Meanwhile, in 
1343, all London hostelries were required to inform their guests of the prohibition 
“against going armed in the City.”71 
Given these affirmations of strict enforcement, it is difficult to ascertain how 
historian Joyce Lee Malcolm could have asserted that the Statute of Northampton 
was never enforced.72  It is unclear what, if any, research Malcolm conducted on the 
                                                          
 
69
 Id. at 610 (October 28, 1332, York). 
 
70
 3 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD III, 1333-1337 294 (January 30, 1334, 
Woodstock) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., London, Mackie And Co.1898); see also id. at 539 
(January 21, 1336, Woodstock) (“The king orders the sheriff to cause proclamation to be 
made throughout that bailiwick that no one, under pain of forfeiture, shall make such 
gatherings, or go armed in fairs, markets and other places.”); id. at 695 (August 18, 1336, 
Perth) (ordering the sheriff of Wilts that “no one, except the king’s serjeants and ministers, 
shall go armed, or ride or lead or procure an armed power before the justices or elsewhere in 
that county, nor do anything to injure the king’s peace against the form of the statute of 
Northampton; and the sheriff shall cause all those whom he finds doing the contrary, after the 
proclamation, to be arrested.”).  
 
71
 1 CALENDAR OF PLEA & MEMORANDA ROLLS OF THE CITY OF LONDON, 1323-1364 156 
(December 19, 1343) (A.H. Thomas ed., 1898).  Edward III issued similar proclamations 
throughout his reign.  See MEMORIALS OF LONDON & LONDON LIFE 268 (H.T. Riley ed., 1868) 
(preventing “broils, riots, and disputes” the king “forbid that any one, on pain of forfeiture of 
so much as unto the King he may forfeit, of whatsoever estate or condition he be, shall go 
armed with haketon, or with plate, or with habergeon . . . or with long dagger, or with any 
other manner of arms suspected, within the City of London, or within the suburbs, or in any 
other places between the said city and the Palace of Westminster, or anywhere in the Palace, 
by land or by water.”); id. at 192 (“It is ordained and granted by the Mayor, Aldermen, and 
Commonality, of the City of London, for maintaining the peace between all manner of folks in 
the said city, that no person, denizen or stranger, other than officers of the City, and those who 
have to keep the peace, shall go armed, or shall carry arms, by night or by day, within the 
franchise of said city.”); id. at 173 (“[N]o person, native or stranger, shall go armed in the 
same city, or shall carry arms by night or by day, on pain of imprisonment, and of losing his 
arms; save only, the serjeants at-arms of our Lord the King, and of my Lady the Queen, and 
the vadlets of the Earls and Barons . . . and save also, the officers of the City, and those who 
shall be summoned unto them, for keeping and maintaining the peace of the City.”); 11 
CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD III, 1360-1364 533 (June 12, 1363, Westminster) 
(H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1909) (“That no man of whatsoever condition shall go armed in the 
said city nor suburbs, nor carry arms by day nor by night, except yeomen of the great lords of 
the land carrying their lords’ swords in their presence, serjeants at arms of the king, of the 
queen, the prince and the king’s other children, ministers of the city and men going in their 
company at their orders to aid them in keeping the peace, upon the pain aforesaid and upon 
pain of losing their arms and armour.”). 
 
72
 MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 9, at 104;  see also Joyce Lee 
Malcolm, The Creation of a “True Antient and Indubitable” Right: The English Bill of Rights 
and the Right to be Armed, 32 J. BRIT. STUD. 226, 242 (1993) (showing Malcolm imported the 
findings in To Keep and Bear Arms from this article).  Malcolm’s misleading and 
insufficiently researched conclusions on the Statute of Northampton have had influential 
effects in Second Amendment scholarship.  See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, 
and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1363-64 (2009) (relying on Malcolm’s 
research for contemporary legal analysis on the Statute of Northampton); Kevin C. Marshall, 
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Statute,73 but the historical record does not support her non-enforcement 
conclusion.74  Not only was the statute enforced to prevent crime, murder, and 
breaches of the peace, but it was even amended by Richard II.  The amendment 
expressly exempted government officers, from carrying arms and mitigated the act to 
misdemeanor forfeiture of arms and a fine.75    
Furthermore, Malcolm’s take on history fails in that there are numerous 
affirmations that the Statute of Northampton was continually enforced to maintain 
law and order.76  In 1377 Richard II ordered the mayor and bailiffs of Newcastle and 
                                                          
Why Can’t Martha Steward Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 716-17 (2009) 
(relying on Malcolm’s research for contemporary legal analysis on the Statute of 
Northampton); David B. Kopel, The Licensing of Concealed Handguns for Lawful Protection: 
Support from Five State Supreme Courts, 68 ALB. L. REV. 305, 317 (2005) (relying on 
Malcolm’s research for contemporary legal analysis on the Statute of Northampton); David B. 
Kopel, It Isn’t About Duck Hunting: The British Origins of the Right to Arms, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 1333, 1347 (1995) (relying on Malcolm’s research for contemporary legal analysis on the 
Statute of Northampton).  It should be noted that Malcolm also serves as a political advocate 
for gun rights.  In particular, Malcolm uses her historical research to advocate for open carry 
and conceal carry rights to prevent crime. Given this article’s findings, Malcolm’s use of 
history for said policy arguments should be called into question. For some of Malcolm’s 
political advocacy, see Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Soft-on-Crime Roots of British Disorder,  
WALL ST. J. (August 16, 2011), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903918104576502613435380574. html;  
David Kopel, Congressional Hearing on Interstate Handgun Carry Reciprocity, VOLKH 
CONSPIRACY (September 14, 2011),  http://volokh.com/2011/09/14/congressional-hearing-on-
interstate-handgun-carry-reciprocity/ (linking to U.S. House Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security debates regarding H.R. 822 where Malcolm testifies for 
conceal carry reciprocity). 
 
73
 For historical articles, preceding Malcolm’s book, that affirm the Statute of 
Northampton was enforced in the fourteenth century, see Putnam, supra note 64, at 30-31; 
Verduyn, supra note 63, at 853, 862-63. 
 
74
 While praised by the pro-gun community and many Second Amendment advocacy 
groups, Malcolm’s methodological approach and findings were sufficiently challenged by 
Lois G. Schwoerer.  See generally Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms, supra note 10; see 
also LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 74-78 (1981) (most of 
Schwoerer’s initial findings have proven to be historically sound).  Since Schwoerer’s 
influential article, Malcolm’s entire work has proven to be highly controversial among 
historians in terms of its research methods and conclusions.  See TIM HARRIS, REVOLUTION: 
THE GREAT CRISIS OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY, 1685-1720, at 343 (2006); Schwoerer, To Hold 
and Bear Arms, supra note 9, at 207–21; Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, supra note 9; 
Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance, supra note 6.  To date, these 
subsequent findings have gained the acceptance of the historical community and have cast out 
Malcolm’s thesis as historically unattainable.  See Brief for English/Early American 
Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(2010) (No. 08-1521) (supported by twenty-one scholars and historians). 
 
75
 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.).  This understanding of amendments to the Statute of 
Northampton was well understood in the Early Republic.  See 1 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, 
A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND INDICTABLE MISDEMEANORS 271-72 (2d ed., 1826). 
 
76
 For some other examples of enforcement, see 4 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, 
EDWARD III, 1337-1339 104 (February 20, 1337, Hatfield) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1900) 
(reminding the sheriff of Berks to enforce the Statute of Northampton and “no one, except the 
king’s serjeants and ministers, shall go armed or ride with armed power before the justices at 
 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
16 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1 
 
Tyne to arrest persons that committed “mischief in that town,” including “going 
armed, bearing arms or leading an armed power to the disturbance of the peace . . . 
.”
77
  He even reminded the mayor and bailiffs that the Statute of Northampton 
provided the legal vehicle to do so: 
[W]ith particular exceptions therein specified, no man whatsoever estate 
or condition shall go with armed force, lead any force to the disturbance 
of the peace, ride or go armed by day or night in fairs, markets or in [the] 
presence of justices or other the king’s ministers or elsewhere under pain 
of losing their arms and of imprisonment . . . . 78 
In 1386, Richard II similarly ordered Sir Henry Grene to “repair to the town of 
Pyghtesle . . . and elsewhere in Nor[t]hamptonshire” and “cause proclamation to be 
made, on the king’s behalf forbidding any man of whatsoever estate or condition to 
go armed there or lead an armed power to the disturbance of the peace, or do aught 
else in breach of the peace or of the Statute of Northampton concerning the carrying 
of arms, or to the terror or disturbance of the people[.]”79 Two years later, he issued 
another order to the bailiffs of Scardburgh: 
Order to arrest and imprison until further order for their deliverance all 
those who shall be found going armed within the town, leading an armed 
power, making unlawful assemblies, or doing aught else whereby the 
peace may be broken and the people put in fear . . . as in the statute lately 
published as Northampton among other things it is contained that no man 
of whatsoever estate or condition shall be bold to appear armed before the 
justices or the other king’s ministers in performance of their office, lead 
an armed force in breach of the peace, ride or go armed by day or night in 
fairs and markets or elsewhere in presence of justices etc. under pain of 
losing his arms and of imprisonment . . . . 80 
Richard II even issued such proclamations to London.  In 1381, he proclaimed 
that “no stranger or privy person, save those deputed to keep the peace, shall go 
                                                          
the said day and places, nor do anything against the peace.”); MEMORIALS OF LONDON AND 
LONDON LIFE, supra note 71, at 295-300 (“[N]o Fleming, Brabanter, or Selander shall go 
armed, or carry any manner of arms, or knife, small or great, with a point, either privily or 
openly, on pain of forfeiture of the same, and imprisonment of his body.”). 
 
77
 1 CALENDAR OF CLOSE ROLLS, RICHARD II, 1377-1381 34 (December 1, 1377, 
Westminster) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1914). 
 
78
 Id.  
 
79
 3 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, RICHARD II, 1385-1389 128 (February 6, 1386, 
Westminster) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1914). 
 
80
 Id. at 399-400 (May 16, 1388, Westminster);  see also 2 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE 
ROLLS, RICHARD II, 1381-1385 3 (August 7, 1381, Reading) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1920) 
(“Order to cause proclamation to be made at the town of Warkenaby and elsewhere on the 
king’s behalf forbidding any man of whatsoever estate or condition to go armed contrary to 
the peace or to the statute of Northampton concerning the carrying of arms contrary to the 
peace.”). 
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armed therein after they shall come to their lodgings . . . .”81  Then in 1391 and 1393 
respectively, he ordered the sheriff to arrest any “man of whatsoever estate or 
condition” that shall “go armed, girt with a sword or arrayed with other 
unaccustomed harness, bear arms, swords, or other such harness, or do aught 
whereby the peace or the statues concerning the bearing of arms contrary to the 
peace may be broken . . . .”82   
Henry IV, Richard II’s successor, also issued proclamations against going armed 
in accordance with the Statute of Northampton.  In 1405, he issued the following 
proclamation to the bailiffs of Suthwerke: 
Order to cause proclamation to be made, forbidding any man of 
whatsoever estate or condition to make unlawful assemblies within the 
town and suburbs of Suthwerke, to go armed, girt with sword or arrayed 
with other unusual harness, to carry with him arms, swords or harness 
aforesaid, or to do aught whereby the peace may be broken or the statutes 
concerning the bearing of arms contrary to the peace, or any of the people 
disturbed or put in fear, under pain of losing such arms etc. and of 
imprisonment . . . . 83 
Nearly forty years later, Henry VI would refer to the Statute of Northampton 
expressly in a proclamation to the sheriffs of York: 
[A] statute published in the parliament holden at Nor[t]hampton in 2 
Edward III, wherein it is contained that no man of whatsoever estate or 
condition shall go armed, lead an armed power in breach of the peace, or 
ride or pass armed by day or night in fairs, markets or elsewhere in the 
presence of justices, the king’s ministers or others under pain of losing his 
arms and of imprisonment . . . . 84 
                                                          
 
81
 2 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, RICHARD II, 1381-1385 92 (November 2, 1381, 
Westminster) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1920).  Richard II issued a similar proclamation for 
London.  See MEMORIALS OF LONDON AND LONDON LIFE, supra note 71, at 43 (“Be it 
proclaimed . . . for the safekeeping of the peace, that no one repairing unto the City after he 
shall have taken up his lodging there, shall go armed, or shall carry upon him, or have carried 
after him, a sword, unless he be a knight.”). 
 
82
 4 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, RICHARD II, 1389-1392 530 (December 23, 1391, 
Westminster) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1922); see also 5 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, 
RICHARD II, 1392-1396 249 (December 18, 1393, Westminster) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 
1925). 
 
83
 2 CALENDAR OF CLOSE ROLLS, HENRY IV, 1402-1405 526 (July 16, 1405, Westminster) 
(A.E. Stamp ed., 1929).  Henry IV issued a similar proclamation to the mayor and sheriffs of 
London.  See 3 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, HENRY IV, 1405-1409 485 (January 30, 1409, 
Westminster) (A.E. Stamp ed., 1931) (“Forbidding any man of whatsoever estate or condition 
to go armed within the city and suburbs, or any except lords, knights and esquires with a 
sword, and the king’s will is that one sword and no more be borne after each of these, under 
pain of forfeiting armour and swords.”). 
 
84
 4 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, HENRY VI, 1441-1447 224 (May 12, 1444, 
Westminster) (A.E. Stamp ed., 1937);  see also 6 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, HENRY VI, 
1454-1461 205 (April 12, 1457, Westminster) (C.T. Flower ed., 1947) (to the sheriff of 
Worcester that “no man of whatsoever estate, degree or condition shall presume . . . to go or 
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Certainly, the crown did not need to proclaim the enforcement of the Statute of 
Northampton for sheriffs, bailiffs, constables, and other government officials to 
enforce the prohibition on “going armed” in the public concourse. The royal 
proclamations merely confirm its existence, subsequent enforcement, and the 
conduct it sought to prevent.  As the historical evidence reveals, by the end of the 
fourteenth century the act of carrying arms in public was a misdemeanor under 
penalty of forfeiture of arms and imprisonment in some cases.  Meanwhile, 
assaulting with weapons, purposefully arming with the intent to harm others, or even 
drawing a weapon was a separate crime in itself in accordance with the facts of the 
case.85   
This fact is confirmed by two important pieces of English legal history.  First, 
there is a 1350 statute that stipulated a separate penalty for “any man of this Realm 
[who] ride armed covertly or secretly with men of arms against any other. . . .”86  
This statute neither amended nor overrode the Statute of Northampton.  Instead, it 
expressly stated that it “shall be judged a Felony or Trespass, according to the Laws 
of the land of the old time used, and according as the case requireth.”87   In contrast, 
the Statute of Northampton was a conduct misdemeanor punishable by fine and jail 
sentence. 
Another piece of historical evidence drawing out this interpretation is England’s 
first common law treatise, which was compiled and written in 1419 by John 
Carpenter.88  Entitled the Liber Albus or The White Book of the City of London, it 
distinguishes between unlawfully carrying arms in the public concourse or without 
the license of government, and the act of drawing a weapon or unlawfully employing 
it.89  The section entitled “That no one go armed” states: 
[T]hat no one, of whatever condition he be, go armed in the said city or in 
the suburbs, or carry arms, by day or by night, except the vadlets of the 
great lords of the land, carrying the swords of their masters in their 
presence, and the serjeants-at-arms of his lordship the King, of my lady 
the Queen, the Prince, and the other children of his lordship the King, and 
the officers of the City, and such persons as shall come in their company 
in aid of them, at their command, for saving and maintaining the said 
peace; under the penalty aforesaid, and the loss of their arms and 
armour.90 
                                                          
ride armed with lances, ‘launcegayes, gleyves’ and other arms contrary to the laws under 
pains therein contained.”). 
 
85
 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.) (going armed secretly or covertly “shall be 
judged Felony or Trespass, according to the Laws of the land of the old time used, and 
according as the case requireth.”) (emphasis added).   
 
86
 Id. 
 
87
 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
88
 JOHN CARPENTER, LIBER ALBUS: THE WHITE BOOK OF THE CITY OF LONDON (Henry 
Thomas Riley ed., London, 1861). 
 
89
 Id. at 335-36. 
 
90
 Id. at 335.  For other affirmations in the Liber Albus that the general going armed in 
public was unlawful, see id. at 229, 555, 556, 558, 560, 580. 
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Particular attention should be given to the fact that going armed in public was 
seen as a government license.  Without a license, only the “officers of the City” and 
those whom “aid” them “at their command” were within the meaning of the law.91  
All other persons of “whatever condition” were not allowed to carry arms in the 
public concourse, including the less populated suburbs.92  At the same time, even if a 
person was licensed to go armed among the public concourse it did not immunize 
them from other legal punishment.  As the Liber Albus details, the law provided for 
separate misdemeanor fines associated with the improper employment of arms: 
[T]he better to preserve the peace of his lordship the King, and that each 
may fear the more to break his peace, it is ordained, that if any person 
shall draw a sword, misericorde, or knife, or any arm, even though he do 
not strike, he shall pay unto the City half a mark, or remain in the prison 
of Newgate fifteen days. And if he shall draw blood of any one, let 
himpay unto the City two shillings, or remain in the said prison forty 
days.93 
This misdemeanor penalty did not even include any potential battery, assault, or 
murder charges that could be imposed.  The latter crimes were tried as independent 
felonies, while going armed in public or unlawfully employing arms in public were 
separate misdemeanors.  Travelers entering London and its suburbs were not 
immune from punishment either.  Even the keeper of the hostel or inn, where the 
armed traveler was boarded, could be held liable for punishment: 
[T]hat every hosteler and herbergeour cause warning to be given unto his 
guests that they leave their arms in their hostels where they shall be 
harboured; and if they shall not do so, and any one shall be found carrying 
arms contrary to said proclamation, through default of warning by his 
host, such host is to be punished by imprisonment and by fine, at the 
discretion of the Mayor and Aldermen.94 
Certainly, prohibitions on going armed did not extend to the realm’s unpopulated 
and unprotected enclaves.  English law generally made exceptions for the use of 
arms in the countryside to those persons qualified by law to possess them.95  Even in 
these instances, however, English law often dictated the terms of their employment 
as to preserve order and safety. 
Assuming that Second Amendment researchers have previously delved into this 
historical issue, the misdemeanor classification96 of “going armed” may explain why 
                                                          
 
91
 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
92
 Id. 
 
93
 Id. at 408. 
 
94
 Id. at 335. 
 
95
 Perhaps the greatest example of this is 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541) (Eng).  The law covered 
who may possess arms, limitations on the size and types of arms that may be possessed, and 
where one may train with the arms. For a discussion, see Charles, “Arms for Their Defence?”, 
supra note 9, at 394-95. 
 
96
 This is confirmed by 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.) (assessing a fine for non-
compliance) (“[N]o Lord, Knight, nor other, little nor great, shall go nor ride by night nor by 
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so many have failed to pinpoint its original meaning,97 for this fact makes it difficult 
to find documentation of its enforcement.  Such records were not maintained to the 
standard they are today and misdemeanors almost never went to trial.  Still, we know 
the prohibition was enforced by government officials because they often swore to 
uphold the tenets of the Statute of Northampton.  For instance, from 1424 onward, 
upon the mayor of Norwich assuming office (and perhaps other cities), the following 
was included into the proclamation: 
The M[a]y[o]r of this Cite comaundyth on the Kyngis behalve, that [each] 
Man kepe the Pe[ace for] this tyme forthwarde, and that no man 
disturb[e], n[or] br[a]ke the forseid Pe[ace], n[or] go armed with in the 
cit[y], upon the p[ai]n of pr[isonment], and forfeiture of all the ar[mor] . . 
. . 
98
 
Overall, the historical evidence is convincing that the Statute of Northampton 
was not regulating dangerous conduct with arms, but the act of carrying arms by 
itself.  As Abraham Fraunce wrote in a 1588 legal treatise, when individuals went 
armed in circumstances “not usually worne and borne, it will strike a feare into 
others that be not armed. . . . .”99  In other words, it was the act of arming in the 
public concourse that terrified the people, for the authority to ensure the public peace 
rested with the local government authorities. 
The tenets of the Statute were even extended to Wales in preparation of its 
England annexation as one of the basis of its new legal system.  The 1534 Henry 
VIII statute forbid the carrying of any “hand-gun, sword, staff, dagger, halberd, 
morespike, spear or any other weapon, privy coat or armour defensive” by any: 
[P]er[s]on or per[s]ons dwelling or re[s]iant within Wales . . . of what 
e[s]tate, degree or condition [s]oever he or they be . . . unto any 
[S]e[ss]ions or court to be holden within Wales . . . or to any place within 
the di[s]tance of two miles from the [s]ame [S]e[ss]ions or court, nor to 
any town, church, fair, market, or other congregation, except it be upon 
the hute and outcry made of any felony or robbery done or perpetrated . . . 
                                                          
day armed . . . upon the pain [of fine and ransom to the crown] save and except the King’s 
officers and ministers in doing their office.”). 
 
97
 For a list of Second Amendment works that have overlooked this history, see 
MALCOLM, supra note 72, at 104; Kopel & Cramer, supra note 38, at 1127, 1133-34; Hardy, 
supra note 39, at 205; Volokh, supra note 40, at 101. 
 
98
 FRANCIS BLOMEFIELD, AN ESSAY TOWARDS A TOPOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF THE COUNTY 
OF NORFOLK: THE HISTORY OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF NORWICH, PART I 138 (London, W. 
Bulmer, and Co. 1806);  see also SIR ANTHONY FIRZHERBERT,  IN THIS BOOK IS CONTAYNED 
THE OFFICES OF SHYRIFFES, BAYLIFFES OF LYBERTYES, ESCHEATORS, CONSTABLES, AND 
CORONERS AND SHEWED WHAT EUERYE ONE OF THEM MAY DOE BY VERTUE OF THEIR 
OFFICES, DRAWEN OUT OF BOOKS OF THE COMMON LAWE AND OF THE STATUTES (London, 
Thomas Marshe 1579) (confirming the Statute of Northampton was to be strictly enforced by 
constables and sheriffs). 
 
99
 ABRAHAM FRAUNCE, THE LAVVIERS LOGLIKE EXAMPLIFYING THE PRAECEPTS OF 
LOGLIKE BY THE PRACTISE OF THE COMMON LAWE 56 (London, William How1588) (citing to 2 
Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.)). 
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[or] except it be by the commandment, licence or a[ss]ent of the [s]aid 
justices, [s]teward or other officer. . . .100 
Having the license of government to carry arms in the public concourse was one 
of the exceptions to the rule, but always conditioned on the permission of 
government.  Going armed in public was not a right, but an exception that most 
generally applied to men of nobility and their attendants.101  Other than this rare 
government allowance, only the keepers of the peace were permitted to carry arms in 
the public concourse.  The purpose of the general prohibition being that the 
government was the preserver of the public peace, not the individual people by being 
armed.  For modern commentators to assert otherwise is to flip the idea of a well-
regulated society on its head.102   
While twenty-first century political scientists may disagree whether prohibitions 
on “going armed” actually prevent murder and crime, it does not supersede the 
historical fact that these were the reasons behind the Statute of Northampton.  For 
instance, upon learning of the increase in murders, manslaughters, and crimes for 
three years, Queen Elizabeth I provided the Statute as one of nine remedies: “1. That 
the sheriff may be accountant. 2. Riding and going armed against the law to be 
punished . . . 9. Preaching ministers to be increased.”103   
This was not the first time Elizabeth I called for the enforcement of gun control 
statutes as a means to preserve the peace and prevent crime.  In 1579, she called for 
the enforcement of all gun control “Actes of Parliament remaining of force, which 
included the tenets of the Statute of Northampton to prohibit the carrying of 
“Dagges, Pistolles, and such like, not on[]ly in Cities and Townes, [but] in all partes 
of the Realme in common high[ways], whereby her Majesties good qu[i]et people, 
desirous to live in peaceable manner, are in feare and danger of their lives . . . .”104  It 
was the carrying of such “offensive weapons” among the public concourse, that was 
“contrary to the Lawes,” including any unlicensed exercising and shooting of 
firearms: 
                                                          
 
100
 26 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 3 (1534) (Eng.) (emphasis added). 
 
101
 This is what Hawkins was referring to when he wrote:  
That Per[s]ons of Quality are in no Danger of Offending again[s]t this Statute by 
wearing common Weapons, or having their u[s]ual Number of Attendants with them, 
for their Ornament or Defence, in [s]uch Places, and upon [s]uch Occa[s]ions, in 
which it is the common Fashion to make u[s]e of them, without cau[s]ing the lea[s]t 
Su[s]picion of an Intention to commit any Act of Violence or Di[s]turbance of the 
Peace. 
1 HAWKINS, supra note 41, at 136.  Eugene Volokh is wrong to assert “‘wearing common 
weapons’ in ‘the common fashion’ was legal” under the Statute of Northampton.  Compare 
Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 20, at 237-39, with Volokh, The First and Second 
Amendments, supra note 40, at 102. 
 
102
 For a discussion on a well-regulated society, natural rights, and individual rights, see 
Charles, supra note 16, at 505-11. 
 
103
 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC: ELIZABETH, 1601-3, WITH ADDENDA 1547-65 
214 (June 1602) (Mary Anne Everett Green ed., 1870) (emphasis added). 
 
104
 BY THE QUENNE ELIZABETH I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE COMMON USE OF 
DAGGES, HANDGUNNES, HARQUEBUZES, CALLIUERS, AND COTES OF DEFENCE 1 (London, 
Christopher Barker 1579). 
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There is another greater disorder growne . . . under the colour of learning 
or exercising to shoote therein, to the service at Musters appointed in 
sundrie Counties for the common service of the Realme . . . by which 
meanes, through the general carrying of them in places not appointed for 
such musters, and by the frequent shooting within them in and ne[ar] 
Cities, Towns corporate, or the Suburbes thereof where great multitude of 
people do live, reside, and trav[el]by and downe for their necessar[y] 
businesse, many harmes do ensue, and occasions like to increase of great 
danger, by such libertie permitted for the use of suche offensive weapons 
in places not convenient.  For these considerations, and for the 
consequences of sundrie mischieves that may ensue, her Majestie by the 
like advice of her Counsell, both commande and charge all man[n]er her 
subjects of what estate so ever they be, from henceforth to forbeare from 
shooting in any man[n]er of Handgunnes, Harquebuzes, Calliuers, or such 
like, of what name so ever they be either charged with Bullet or without, 
in any place, but on[ly] at and in the places that are or shall be appointed 
for common Musters . . . or shall be appointed to be meete places, either 
within the great Cities or the Suburbes of the same, or in places farre of[f] 
from Townes of habitation, for the exercise of Shooting in such places as 
is aforesayde . . . . 105 
In 1594, Elizabeth I reminded her officials of this prohibition on carrying arms 
among the public concourse.  In particular, she professed that the public carrying of 
pistols was “to the terrour of all people professing to travel and live peaceably . . .”106  
This “terrour” not only included the “open carrying [of] such Dags, but also in a 
device to have secretly small Dagges, commonly called pocket Dags . . . .”107  Six 
years later, Elizabeth I again commanded “all Justices of the Peace to take straight 
order for the due execution of the Lawes aforesaid, according to the true intent and 
meaning of the same,” including the “car[r]ying and use of Gunnes (contrary to the 
sayd Statutes) and especially of Pistols, Birding pieces, and other short pieces and 
small shot . . . .”108 
It is important to note, as with original intent of Statute of Northampton, each of 
Elizabeth’s measures sought to maintain social order and prevent potential crimes 
such as murder, assault, and robbery.  Certainly, modern day empirical data 
concerning dangerous weapons and public safety are always worth considering in 
terms of crafting effective legislation.  However, these public safety concerns have 
been historically left with the government police power, and unquestioned.109  In 
                                                          
 
105
 Id. at 1-2. 
 
106
 BY THE QUENNE ELIZABETH I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE CARRIAGE OF DAGS, AND 
FOR REFORMATION OF SOME OTHER GREAT DISORDERS 1 (London, Christopher Barker 1594). 
 
107
 Id. 
 
108
 BY THE QUENNE ELIZABETH I: A PROCLAMATION PROHIBITING THE USE AND CARIAGE OF 
DAGGES, BIRDING PIECES, AND OTHER GUNNES, CONTRARY TO LAW 1 (London, Christopher 
Barker 1600). 
 
109
 For an American perspective discussing this point, see Adam Winkler, The Reasonable 
Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597 (2006); Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the 
Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2007).  While Winkler’s survey is sufficient for 
this point, it should be noted that his findings are only a basic historical survey, and do not 
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terms of the historical record, there exists no empirical evidence that the Statute was 
ever viewed as an infringement on the natural right of self-defense or ever an issue 
of public scrutiny in correspondence, pamphlets, books, or newspapers. 
B.  The Statute of Northampton in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century England 
Despite the Statute of Northampton expressly prohibiting the act of carrying 
arms, the question that lingers is whether this perception changed.  In other words, 
did later generations view the Statute as prohibiting only dangerous conduct?  Did 
the 1689 English Declaration of Rights allowance to “have arms” change the status 
quo?  The best source to start answering these questions is William Hawkins’ Pleas 
of the Crown, for it would be continuously cited in eighteenth century treatises as the 
authority on the Statute of Northampton.   
Hawkins wrote: 
That in [s]ome Ca[s]es there may be an Affray where there is no actual 
Violence; as where a Man arms him[s]elf with dangerous and unu[s]ual 
Weapons, in such a Manner as will naturally cau[s]e a Terror to the 
People, which is [s]aid to have been always an Offence at the Common 
Law, and is [s]trictly prohibited by many Statutes [including the Statute of 
Northampton] . . . .110 
Hawkins’ analysis confirms the act of carrying a “dangerous” weapon offends 
the law, yet it still raises two important questions.  First, what constituted a 
“dangerous” or “unusual” weapon in the early seventeenth century?  Second, what 
“manner” of carrying such arms will “cause Terror to the People”?  If we use the 
original intent of the Statute of Northampton as a guidepost, the answer to these 
questions is the carrying of any weapon that may endanger society among the 
concourse of the people.111  Robert Gardiner’s 1692 The Compleat Constable 
corresponds with this understanding.  Gardiner wrote the Statute of Northampton 
covered instances where a “Person [s]hall Ride or go Arm’d offen[s]ively . . . or in 
Fairs or Markets or el[s]ewhere, by Day or by Night, in affray of their Maje[s]ties 
                                                          
fully articulate the Anglo-American tradition of gun control, especially concerning the Statute 
of Northampton. 
 
110
 1 HAWKINS, supra note 41, at 135.  It is important to note that some treatises stipulated 
“dangerous and unusual weapons,” and others “dangerous or unusual weapons.” (emphasis 
added).  Compare HARRY TOULMIN, THE MAGISTRATE’S ASSISTANT 5 (1807) (“There may be 
an affray, where there is no actual violence; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and 
unusual weapons, in such a manner as will naturally cause terror to the people.”), with JOHN 
HAYWOOD, THE DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, IN THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 
176 (Nashville , Thomas G. Bradford, 1810) (“[R]iding or going armed with dangerous or 
unufual weapons, [is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the 
land.]”). 
 
111
 For some treatises supporting that arming in itself constitutes a terror of the people, see 
JOHN FAUCHEREAUD GRIMKE, THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 405 (Philadelphia , 
R. Aitken, 1778) (“[T]here mu[s]t be some su[c]h circum[s]tances, either of actual force or 
violence, or at lea[s]t of an apparent tendency thereto, as are naturally apt to [s]trike a terror 
into the people; as of armour, threatening [s]peeches, or turbulent ge[s]tures; for every [s]uch 
offence must be laid to be done to the terror of the people.”); HAYWOOD,  supra note 110, at 
176 (“Riding or going armed with dangerous or unufual weapons, [is a crime against the 
public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land.]”). 
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Subjects, and Breach of the Peace; or wear or carry any Daggers, Guns, or Pi[s]tols 
Charged . . . .”112  The only persons who maintained the “lawful Authority to bear 
Armour or Weapons” were government officials, and “Per[s]ons pur[s]uing the Hue 
and Cry, in ca[s]e of Felony and other Offences again[s]t the Peace . . . .”113   
In the subsequent 1724 edition, the power of constables to disarm persons that 
“go armed” was further affirmed: 
For the preventing the Breach of the Peace, [the constable] . . . may stop 
all such Persons as go or ride unlawfully arm’d and take their Arms from 
them, and commit them to Prison . . . . 114 
Other early treatises came to similar conclusions by interpreting the Statute of 
Northampton as an affirmation of governmental police authority.  In 1694, James 
Tyrell wrote how the “Sheriffs of the Counties [are] to make u[s]e thereof for the 
Execution of the Laws,” including the act of persons “[s]o much as to Ride or go 
Arm'd, as may appear by the Statute of Northampton . . . .”115  Thus, it was unlawful 
for persons “to take up Arms, unle[ss] in their own defence against Illegal Violence, 
and in [s]uch manner as the Law directs . . . . ”116 Tyrell’s reference to “as the Law 
directs” is historically significant, for it serves as another reference to the sheriff or 
constable’s authority in assembling the hue and cry to repel “illegal violence.”  
Excluding the common law castle doctrine,117 such authority did not rest with the 
general people.118  
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 ROBERT GARDINER, THE COMPLEAT CONSTABLE 18 (1692) (emphasis added).  See also 
WILLIAM SHEPPARD, OFFICES AND DUTIES OF CONSTABLES, BORSHOLDERS, TYTHINGMEN, 
TREASURERS OF THE COUNTY-STOCK, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, AND OTHER LAY MINISTERS, at 
ch.8, §4 (4th ed., London 1657) (“If any person whatsoever . . . shall be so bold as to goe or 
ride armed by night or by day, as to carry any Dag[ger]s or Pistols” the constable may seize 
the arms); GEORGE MERITON, GUIDE FOR CONSTABLES, CHURCHWARDENS, OVERSEERS OF THE 
POOR, SURVERYORS OF THE HIGHWAYS, TREASURERS OF THE COUNTY STOCK, MASTERS OF THE 
HOUSE OF CORRECTION, BAYLIFFS OF MANNOURS, TOLL-TAKERS IN FAIRS, & C. 22 (London 
1669) (“If any per[s]on [s]hall ride or go armed offen[s]ively before the Kings Ju[s]tices, or 
before any other the King’s Officers or Mini[s]ters during their Office, or in Faires or Markets 
or el[s]ewhere by Night or by Day in Affray of the King’s people, and breach of the Peace, or 
ware or carry any Guns, Daggers, or Pi[s]tols charged; in [s]uch Case the Constable upon the 
fight hereof may [s]eize and take away their Armour and other Weapons . . . . ”) (citing 2 
Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.), 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.), and other English statutes). 
 
113
 GARDINER, supra note 112, at 18-19.  The Hue and Cry could only be pursued at the 
discretion of the constable.  See Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well 
Regulated” Militia, supra note 17, at 98-99 and accompanying footnotes. 
 
114
 ROBERT GARDINER, THE COMPLETE CONSTABLE 13 (6th ed. 1724). 
 
115
 JAMES TYRRELL, BIBLIOTHECA POLITICA; OR AN EQUIRY INTO THE ANCIENT 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT BOTH IN RESPECT TO THE JUST EXTENT OF REGAL 
POWER, AND THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE SUBJECT 639 (London, W. Rawlins, S. 
Roycroft, and H. Sawbridge 1694). 
 
116
 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
117
 See 1 HAWKINS, supra note 41, at 136 (outlining castle doctrine). 
 
118
 See GARDINER, supra note 112, at 18-19; Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a 
“Well Regulated” Militia, supra note 17, at 98-99. 
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Joseph Keble’s 1683 An Assistance to the Justices of the Peace conveyed the 
same interpretation of the Statute of Northampton: 
Again, if any per[s]on what[s]oever (except the Kings Servants and 
Mini[s]ters in his pre[s]ence, or in executing his Precepts or other 
Officers, or [s]uch as [s]hall a[ss]i[s]t them, and except it be upon the 
Hue-and-cry make to keep the peace, &c.) [s]hall be [s]o bold as to go or 
ride Armed, by night or by day, in Fairs, Markets, or any other places . . . 
then any Con[s]table, or any of the [s]aid Officers may take [s]uch 
Armour from him for the Kings u[s]e, and may al[s]o commit him to the 
Gaol; and therefore it [s]hall be good in this behalf for the[s]e Officers to 
[s]tay and Arre[s]t all [s]uch per[s]ons as they [s]hall find to carry Dags 
or Pistols, or to be apparelled with Privy-Coats or Doublets, as by the 
Proclamation made [by Queen Elizabeth]. . . .119 
As shown above, Keble’s analysis is historically accurate in that the Statute 
remained in force as a prohibition on going publicly armed throughout Elizabeth’s 
reign.  It remained a staple of the law into the seventeenth century as is evidenced by 
the following proclamation of James I: 
Whereas the bearing of Weapons covertly, and specially of short Dagges, 
and Pistols . . . hath ever beene, and yet is by the Lawes and polic[y] of 
this Realme straitly forbidden as car[r]ying with it inevitable danger in the 
hands of desperate persons . . . And some persons being questioned for 
bearing of such about them, have made their excuse, That being decayed 
in their estates, and indebted, and therefore fearing continually to be 
Arrested, they weare the same for their defence against such Arrests.  A 
case so farre from just excuse, as it is of itselfe a grievous offence for any 
man to arme himselfe against Justice, and therefore deserves . . . sharpe 
and severe punishment.  But besides this evill consequence . . . we have 
just cause to provide also against those devilish spirits, that maligning the 
quiet and happiness of this Estate, may use the same to more execrable 
endes.  And therefore by this Due Proclamation, We doe straitly charge 
and command all Our subjects and other persons whatsoever, that they 
neither make, nor bring into this Realme, any Dagges, Pistols, or other 
like short Gunnes [prohibited by law] . . . .120 
In contrast to this historical evidence and the express text of the Statute of 
Northampton, Eugene Volokh claims it did not override the general wearing of 
“common weapons” in a common fashion.121  He provides no substantiated historical 
                                                          
 
119
 JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, FOR THE EASIER 
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 224 (W London, W. Rawlins, S. Roycroft, and H. Sawbridge 
1683) (emphasis added); see also JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO THE JUSTICES OF THE 
PEACE, FOR THE EASIER PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 224 (2d ed., London, W. Rawlins, S. 
Roycroft, and H. Sawbridge 1689) (emphasis added).  For Elizabeth I applying the tenets of 
the Statute of Northampton to pistols and dags, see supra pp. 20-22 and accompanying 
footnotes. 
 
120
 BY THE KING JAMES I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE USE OF POCKET DAGS 1 (London, 
Robert Barker, 1612). 
 
121
 Volokh, supra note 40, at 102 (quoting 1 HAWKINS, supra note 41, at 136). 
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support for this assertion except a selective reading of Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown.  
Hawkins, however, was referring to the legal exceptions already addressed, which 
are narrow exceptions (afforded by the lawmakers) to the general rule.122  The first 
exception to the Statute was permitting persons of “quality” or the nobility’s right to 
wear arms and be accompanied with armed escorts.123  Such persons were exempt 
because they were presumed to be “in no danger of offending” the law, or having 
“an intention to commit any act of violence, or disturbing of the peace.”124  
Meanwhile, the second exception was government officials and keepers of the peace, 
and was confirmed by Richard II.125 
Volokh’s historical interpretation also does not comport with Chapter 63, Section 
8 of Hawkins treatise: 
[A] Man cannot excu[s]e the wearing [s]uch Armour in Publick, by 
alledging that [s]uch a one threatened him, and that he wears it for the 
Safety of his Per[s]on from his A[ss]ault; but it hath been re[s]olved, That 
no one [s]hall incur the Penalty of the [s]aid Statute for a[ss]embling his 
Neighbours and Friends in his own Hou[s]e, again[s]t tho[s]e who 
threaten to do him any Violence therein, becau[s]e a Man’s Hou[s]e is as 
his Ca[s]tle.126 
Here, we find English common law support for the Supreme Court’s holding in 
District of Columbia v. Heller,127 but Hawkins makes it clear that the preparatory 
wearing or carrying of arms in public was not protected.  As the manual A Help to 
the Magistrates and Ministers of Justices illustrates, a constable swore to apprehend 
all “Vagabonds, Rogues, Night-walkers . . . and other suspected Persons, and of such 
as go Armed[.]”128 
Lastly, Volokh’s interpretation does not take into account the English licensing 
system.  Under the common law and affirmed by subsequent statutes, the ability of 
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 See GARDINER, supra note 112, at 18-19.  
 
123
 This is confirmed by numerous editions of Giles Jacob’s dictionary.  See GILES JACOB, 
A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms” (7th ed. n.p., Henry Lintot 1756) (“By the 
Common Law it is an Offence for Persons to go or ride armed with dangerous and unusual 
Weapons; But Gentlemen may wear common Armour according to their Quality”); GILES 
JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms”  (8th ed. London, H. Woodfall and W. 
Strahan 1762); A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms” (Owen Ruffhead & J. Morgan 
eds., Dublin, n.pub. 1773); GILES JACOB, 1 A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms” 
(T.E. Tomlins ed., London, Andrew Strahan 1797). 
 
124
 JAMES PARKER, THE CONDUCTOR GENERAL . . . ADAPTED TO THESE UNITED STATES 11 
(New York, John Patterson 1788) (quoting 1 HAWKINS, supra note 41, at 136). 
 
125
 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.) (“[N]o Lord, Knight, or other, little nor great, shall go 
nor ride by night nor by day armed . . . save and except the King’s officers and ministers in 
doing their office.”). 
 
126
 1 HAWKINS, supra note 41, at 136. This exemption to assemble neighbors for the Hue 
and Cry could only apply to those instances where a constable, sheriff, or magistrate could not 
be obtained to order the Hue and Cry.  See Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a 
“Well-Regulated” Militia, supra note 17, at 98-99 and accompanying footnotes. 
 
127
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 
128
 A HELP TO MAGISTRATES, AND MINISTERS OF JUSTICE 107 (3d ed., London 1705). 
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persons to go armed among the public concourse was based upon government 
acquiescence only.  A person was required to obtain the crown’s license to go armed 
in the public concourse.129  The status quo remained after the adoption of the 1689 
English Declaration of Rights “have arms” provision.130  For instance, on December 
21, 1699, the following proclamation was published in The Post Boy: 
Whereas, We have received Information That several Persons not 
Qualified by the Laws of this Realm, to carry Arms, have nevertheless in 
contempt and Violation of the Law, taken on them to Ride and Go Armed, 
and for their so doing, have sometimes insisted on Licences formerly 
Granted, which have been Re-called and made Void . . . and others have 
wholly Falsified and Counterfeited Licences to carry Arms . . . We have 
for the Remedying the said Evil, thought fit to Re-call all Licences 
whatsoever . . . and to Require all persons whatsoever having such 
Licences, to bring in and Lodge the same with the Clerk of the Council . . 
. . 
131
 
On March 18, 1713, the lord-lieutenant of Dublin, Ireland issued a similar 
proclamation after a fire destroyed the record books containing the licensing records: 
[W]hereas we are informed, That several Persons not qualified by the 
Laws of this Realm to carry Arms, have nevertheless in Contempt and 
Violation thereof, taken upon them to ride and go armed; For prevention 
whereof.  We do strictly require all Magistrates and Justices of the Peace 
to make diligent search for and seize all Arms of any sort or kind 
whatsoever, which they shall find in the Custody of such Persons not 
qualified by the Laws of this Kingdom, to carry Arms . . . . 132 
In addition to Volokh’s flawed approach to historically determining the Statute’s 
prosecutorial scope, there is another historically based argument to limit the Statute’s 
original intent and express language.  A contingent of scholars assert the holding in 
Sir John Knight’s case stands for the proposition that, in addition to “going armed,” 
particularized terrifying conduct is a requirement to violate the Statute.133 
A close examination of the English Reports and the case history does not support 
this conclusion.  The King’s Bench held the intent of the Statute was “to punish 
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 See 4 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD I, supra note 53, at 318 (September 15, 
1299, Canterbury); id. at 588 (July 16, 1302, Westminster); 5 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, 
EDWARD I, supra note 55, at 210 (June 10, 1304, Stirling); 1 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, 
EDWARD II,  supra note 56, at 553 (October 12, 1312, Windsor); 4 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE 
ROLLS, EDWARD II, supra note 59, at 560 (April 28, 1326, Kenilworth). 
 
130
 Following the 1689 Declaration of Rights, the government continued to disarm 
dangerous and disaffected persons and enforce preceding gun control statutes without any 
question of a violation of the right to “have arms.”  See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?, 
supra note 9, at 374-80, 382-83. 
 
131
 THE POST BOY (London), December 21, 1699, at 1, col. 1. 
 
132
 THE POST BOY (London), April 3, 1714, at 1, col. 1. 
 
133
 See Hardy, District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, supra note 
39, at 205; Kopel & Cramer, State Standards of Review for the Right to the Keep and Bear 
Arms, supra note 38, at 1127, 1133-34.  
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people who go armed to terrify the King’s subjects[,]” affirming the act of “going 
armed” was a “great offence at the common law, as if the King were not able or 
willing to protect his subjects; and therefore this Act is but an affirmance of that 
law[.]”134  This legal definition takes nothing way from the original meaning of the 
Statute.135  It supports the proposition that going armed with dangerous weapons in 
the public concourse, without the license of the government, terrified the people.   
Furthermore, the King’s Bench stipulated the narrow holding that it could not 
inflict any other punishment than what the Statute directed.  In this case, Sir John 
Knight was cloaked with governmental authority because he committed the act in 
accordance with the Mayor and Aldermen of Bristol.136  Thus, under the terms of the 
Statute of Northampton, Knight qualified as one of the “King’s Officers and 
Ministers in doing their Office,” and would have been exempted from punishment.137  
This explains why the jury acquitted Knight, and nothing further could be done 
according to the Statute.138   
At the trial itself, the political nature of Knight’s prosecution was well-known.  
Despite facilitating and taking part in the seizure of the priest, the Mayor and 
Aldermen of Bristol were acquitted of all charges, yet the Attorney General still 
prosecuted Knight.139   In an attempt to separate Knight from the other government 
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 Sir John Knight’s Case, (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B.). 
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 See supra pp. 10-21; see also JOSEPH HIGGS, A GUIDE TO JUSTICES 56 (n.p. 1734) 
(stating that a constable “may stop and seize all Persons who shall ride, or go armed.”);  
Miller, Guns as Smut, supra note 24, at 1317-18. 
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 The fact that the incident in question involved the participation of government officials 
is affirmed by the Calendar of State Papers.  See CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC: 
JAMES II, 1686-7, at 118 (May 1, 1686) (“The King, being informed that the Mayor and some 
other magistrates of Bristol lately seized upon a priest, who was going to officiate privately in 
a house there . . . and having received an account that Sir John night was not only the informer 
but a busy actor in the matter by going himself to search.”) (emphasis added); id. (June 7, 
1686) (Sir John Knight to Earl of Sunderland) (“But in regard the Duke of Beaufort’s letter to 
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myself but against the Mayor and Aldermen, as if they acted by my influence, I think it not 
amiss to make a defence whilst with little trouble it may be cleared.”).  Knight was originally 
arrested for “several seditious practices.”   Id. (May 22, 1686). 
 
137
 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.); see also 1 HAWKINS, supra note 9, § 9 (stating that 
persons of quality are presumed to not offend the Statute of Northampton). 
 
138
 Joyce Lee Malcolm contends the King’s Bench was unwilling to apply the statute.  See 
MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 9, at 105.  This interpretation is false.  The 
King’s Bench clearly acknowledged the legality of the statute, but could not inflict any more 
punishment after the jury acquitted.  Malcolm also provides no substantiated evidence for her 
proposition that the Statute of Northampton was never enforced, nor that the jury’s acquittal 
led to the greater disarmament of England.  These are some of the many historical myths that 
continue to permeate among modern Second Amendment scholars. 
 
139
 Knight, the Mayor, and Aldermen were all called to the Hampton Court to answer for 
their actions.  See 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE 1677-1691: THE REIGN OF JAMES 
II, 1685-1687, at 134 (Tim Harris ed., Boydell Press 2007).  On June 12, 1686, the Mayor and 
Aldermen requested forgiveness for “any faults,” pled “ignorante of the Lawes in that Case,” 
and were “discharged, so that [the charges] will fall upon Sir John Knight[.]”  Id. at 136.  It is 
also worth noting that the actions of Knight, the Mayor, and Aldermen were deemed favorable 
by those in Bristol.   Id. at 113 (stating Sir John Knight did “disturbe and imprison a Popish 
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officials, the Attorney General sought prosecution under the Statute of Northampton 
by attempting to prove that Knight was disaffected to government, and could not be 
exempt by law.140  As evidence of his legal theory, the Attorney General offered that 
Knight had refused a “Commission to be a Captain in the time of Monmouth’s 
Rebellion,” and was outside the protective scope of governmental immunity.141  
Knight countered with “very good proofe” that he acted as one of the crown’s 
officials, and only refused the commission because of the distances involved.142   If 
anything, Knight felt his refusal of the king’s commission had done more of a 
service in that he offered prudent advice to the crown’s ministers.143   
The indictment itself even accused Knight of being a “very disloyall and 
Seditious and ill affected man . . . [that] had caused Musketts or Armes to be carried 
before him in the Streets, and into the Churck to publick service to the terror of his 
Majesties Leige people.”144  Knight admitted that he was armed upon going to the 
church, but refused to concede that he was disaffected.145  In explaining the turn of 
events, Knight also informed the King’s Bench of an assault and identifiable threat 
to his person.146  Days earlier, two Irishmen had been waiting outside Knight’s home 
to assault his person.   After waiting to no avail, the Irishmen approached a woman 
                                                          
Conventicle that was at Mass, but they were suddenly after set at liberty, this is very 
wonderfull they were disturbed once.”). 
 
140
 The legal theory behind the prosecution is captured by Joseph Keble.  See KEBLE, supra 
note 119, at 647 (writing one may prosecute government officials so as to judge and punish 
them “in their Natural Persons, and not in their Body Politick” when they have committed an 
act by force outside the scope of their office). 
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 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 139, at 307.   
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 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 139, at 307-08. 
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 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 139, at 308. 
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 Id. at 141 (emphasis added).  The indictment was presented on June 12, 1686.  See 1 
NARCISSUS LUTTRELL, A BRIEF HISTORICAL RELATION OF STATE AFFAIRS FROM SEPTEMBER 
1678 TO APRIL 1714 380 (Oxford 1857) (“Sir John Knight pleaded not guilty to an information 
exhibited against him for goeing with a blunderbus in the streets, to the terrifyeing his 
majesties subjects.”).  Joyce Lee Malcolm does not include the indictment in her account, yet 
contends it occurred on June 10, 1686.  See MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 
9, at 104.  The record to which Malcolm refers says nothing of a firearm or the Statute of 
Northampton.  See CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC: JAMES II, 1686-7, at 136 (June 10, 
1686) (“Information is preferring against Sir John Knight for creating and encouraging fears 
in the hearts of his Majesty’s subjects.”). 
 
145
 Knight talked about his defense in a June 7, 1686 letter to the Earl of Sutherland.  He 
defended his actions by acting in conjunction with the Mayor and Aldermen.  See CALENDAR 
OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC, supra note 136 (June 7, 1686) (Sir John Knight to Earl of 
Sunderland).  The jury agreed with this defense, finding Knight to be “loyall.”  See 1 
LUTTRELL, supra note 144, at 389 (“Sir John Knight, the loyall, was tried at the court of kings 
bench for a high misdemeanour, in goeing armed up and down with a gun att Bristoll; who 
being tried by a jury of his own citty, that knew him well, he was acquitted, not thinking he 
did it with any ill design . . . ’tis thought his being concerned in taking up a popish priest at 
Bristoll occasioned this prosecution.”).   
 
146
 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 139, at 307. 
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for Knight’s whereabouts, and brutally beat her for failing to reveal the location.147  
In addition to this incident, there was another involving Mack Don, who Knight 
claimed to have assaulted his person, although no charges were ever brought against 
Don.148  It was for these reasons that Knight confessed to the court that he always 
“rode with a Sword and a Gun,” and had a number of armed attendants,149 which had 
been the nobility’s allowance under the common law.150  
However, Knight never rested his innocence or legal defense on preparatory self-
defense or the nobility’s common law right to go armed with lawful attendants.  It 
was not the act Knight was being charged with, nor was any of the “attendants” 
charged in violation of the Statute.  Instead, Knight defended the case in terms of 
“active Loyalty” to the crown151 and even cited Richard II’s statute exempting 
governmental officials from punishment.152  It is a historical point of emphasis that 
when Knight was armed to apprehend the priest he was under the license of the 
king’s service.  It is for this reason the King’s Bench doubted the conduct “came 
within the equity and true meaning of the Statute of Northampton about goeing 
armed . . . .”153  The Chief Justice even scolded the Attorney General for indicting 
Knight.  The Chief Justice stated, “[I]f there be any blinde side of the Kings 
business[s] you will al[ways] lay your finger upon it, and shew it to the Defendants . 
. . . ”
154
   
Here again, we see the difference between myth and reality. Those that read Sir 
John Knight’s case as a turning point in the popular understanding of the Statute of 
Northampton are purporting a historical myth to advance a Second Amendment 
agenda.155  Indeed, Knight was accused of walking “about the streets armed with 
guns,”156 but the jury acquitted Knight because he was a government official that was 
well-affected to the crown.157   
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 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 139, at 307.  
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 See 1 HAWKINS, supra note 10, at § 9. 
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 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 139, at 308.    
 
152
 See Rex v. Knight, (1686) 90 Eng. Rep. 330.     
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 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 139, at 308.  Given Knight’s 
station, the only way he could have offended the statute is if he was outside the loyalty of the 
crown and had acted rebelliously in violation of government decree.  It is for this reason that a 
brief summary of the English report claims the Chief Justice said Knight’s crime must appear 
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the Statute of Northampton.  See Rex v. Knight, (1686) 90 Eng. Rep. 330.  It is at this point 
that the King’s Bench acknowledged the exception for “gentlemen” or nobility to “ride 
armed” as not to offend the Statute.  Id.; see also 1 HAWKINS, supra note 9, at § 9; Charles, 
Scribble Scrabble, supra note 20, at 238-39 (discussing the nobility’s exception to the rule 
that did not apply to the general public). 
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 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 139, at 308. 
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 See supra notes 73 and 133. 
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C.  The Statute of Northampton in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century America 
The mythical approach to Sir John Knight’s case does not explain why 
subsequent treatises did not recognize the holding as embodying a right to carry arms 
among the public concourse, including Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown.158  As will be 
discussed in this section, the founding generation commonly understood the Statute 
of Northampton according to its original meaning—prohibiting the carrying of arms 
among the concourse of the people to preserve the public peace. 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the “right to keep 
and bear arms” is deeply rooted in our Anglo origins.159  Assuming this fact, courts 
must work within this framework and assume: “By the time of the founding, the 
right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects.”160  It was a right 
that “unlike some other English rights . . . was codified in a written Constitution.”161  
Logically, given that the founders borrowed their understanding of the right to arms 
from their English ancestors, they would have also borrowed and understood the 
ideological and philosophical restrictions on the right, including the Statute of 
Northampton.162 
At the same time, scholars such as Richard L. Aynes are correct to question the 
wholesale importing of English law into American constitutionalism.163  There were 
instances where the Constitution’s drafters sought to remedy the defects of the 
English system.164  Fortunately, this problem does not present itself with the 
importation of the Statute of Northampton, the English common law, or the English 
police power concerning public arms carrying.  The Statute was expressly 
incorporated165 by Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia in the years 
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 Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown offers sufficient proof in this regard.  See 1 HAWKINS, 
supra note 9, at § 8 (stating preparatory arming is not a defense to the Statute of 
Northampton).  See THE POST BOY (London), December 21, 1699, at 1, col. 1; THE POST BOY 
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 Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald, supra note 21, at 
35-36; see also supra pp. 6-10 (discussing Supreme Court’s use of history to define 
constitutional scope of the Second Amendment). 
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 Richard L. Aynes, McDonald v. Chicago, Self-Defense, the Right to Bear Arms, and the 
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were the latter’s republican structure.  See Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit 
of Happiness” in Our Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 523-32. 
 
165
 Other state and local authorities may have enforced the Statute of Northampton as part 
of the English common law, even without an express statute.  This is confirmed by the varying 
constable oaths published in eighteenth century legal treatises.  See infra note 178 and 
accompanying text. 
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immediately after the adoption of the Constitution.166  In the case of North Carolina, 
the statute read almost verbatim by prohibiting going armed at night or day “in fairs, 
markets, nor in the presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, nor in no part 
elsewhere . . . .”167 
Furthermore, history tells us that the importation of the English common law was 
prevalent among the founding generation.  Associate Justice Samuel Chase kept a 
journal compiling all the British case law still in force within the United States.168  
Meanwhile, the 1776 Maryland Constitution guaranteed its inhabitants:  
[T]he Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the 
course of that law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as 
existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-siz; and 
which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other 
circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the 
Courts of Law or Equity . . . .169   
Certainly preventing breaches of the peace and ensuring the public safety were part 
of this “common law.” 
The earliest American statute prohibiting “going armed” appears to have been 
enacted in 1686 by the New Jersey Assembly.  Entitled An Act Against Wearing 
Swords, &c., it sought to prevent “several Persons [from] wearing Swords, Daggers, 
Pistols, Dirks, Stilladoes, Skeines, or any other unusual and unlawful Weapons” in 
public, for it induced “great Fear and Quarrels” among the inhabitants.170  The only 
statutory exceptions to the rule were the carrying of weapons for lawful purposes 
such as those arms carried by magistrates, the militia for state sanctioned musters, 
and “all Strangers, Travelling upon their lawful Occasions thro’ this Province, 
behaving themselves peaceably.”171  
                                                          
 
166
 See 2 THE PERPETUAL LAWS, OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS CONSTITUTION TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL COURT, IN 
1798 259 (Worcester, Isaiah Thomas 1799) (confirming that no person “shall ride or go armed 
offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens of this Commonwealth”); FRANCOIS-
XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE 
STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 60–61 (Newbern 1792) (confirming that no person may “go nor  
ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the King’s Justices, or 
other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere”); A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF A PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 33 
(Augustine Davis 1794) (confirming that no person may go or ride armed by night or day, in 
fairs, markets, or elsewhere, or in the presence of the Court’s Justices or other ministers of 
justice). 
 
167
 MARTIN, supra note 166, at 61 (emphasis added).  
 
168
 See Samuel Chase, British Case Law Citations (1800) (unpublished journal, on file with 
the Library of Congress Rare Books Division, Washington, DC). 
 
169
 MD. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. III, § 1. 
 
170
 THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-
JERSEY 289 (1758).   
 
171
 Id. at 290. 
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The statutory use of the phrase “great fear” highlights the importance of the 
police power in preventing the dangers imposed by public carrying.172  Often legal 
treatises included the phrase “terror of the people” to illustrate this fact.173  
Subsequent colonial and state assemblies obliged by including the language in their 
respective statutes.174  The terminology did not legally require “circumstances where 
carrying of arms was unusual and therefore terrifying.”175  Instead, the act of riding 
or going armed among the people was deemed terrifying itself and considered a 
breach against the public peace.176   
It is worth noting that, throughout the eighteenth century, prohibitions against 
“going” or “riding” armed were worded differently.  Some statutes imported text 
from the Statute of Northampton.177  Some borrowed the language from the 
                                                          
 
172
 On June 12, 1809, Gloucester, Massachusetts passed a series of resolutions confirming 
“the object of Government is the Security and Protection of the governed.” BOSTON GAZETTE, 
January 12, 1809, at 2. One of those protections was that the government “will u[s]e all lawful 
means ‘to arre[s]t di[s]turbers and breakers of the peace; or [s]uch others as may . . . go armed 
by night . . . to the fear and terror of the good people of this town . . . . ” Id.   
 
173
 The phrase was seemingly used as a substitute for the different public locations listed in 
the Statute of Northampton and other English statutes.  See 2 Edw. 3, c.3 (1328) (Eng.) 
(banning public carry before government officials, fairs, markets, and other public places); 26 
Hen. 8, c. 6 (1534) (Eng.) (banning weapons from “any Place within the Di[s]tance of two 
Miles from the [s]ame Se[s][s]ions or Court, nor any Town, Church, Fair, Market or other 
Congregation, except it be upon a Hute or Outcry”); 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.) (limiting 
the shooting of arms “to shoot with any Handgun Demie hake, or Haquebut at any Butt or 
Banke of earth only in place convenient for the same”).  For some examples of this substitute 
in treatises, see HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT’S INHERITANCE 
248 (1736) (stating that the constable “may take away Arms of them who ride or go armed in 
Terror of the People”); GEORGE WEBB, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 92 
(1736) (the constable “may take away Arms from [s]uch who ride, or go, offensively armed, 
in Terror of the People . . . .”). 
 
174
 See 2 THE PERPETUAL LAWS, OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS CONSTITUTION TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL COURT, IN 
1798 259 (1799) (“[E]very Ju[s]tice of the Peace . . . may cau[s]e to be [s]taid and are[s]ted . . 
. [s]uch as [s]hall ride or go armed offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens of this 
Commonwealth . . . .”). 
 
175
 Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, supra note 40, at 101. 
 
176
 See 25 Edw. 3, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.) (confirming it was a separate offense to go or 
ride armed “covertly or secretly” against any other); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 148-49 (1769) (“The offence of riding or going armed, with 
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good 
people of the land.”); HAYWOOD, supra note 110, at 107 (“Riding or going armed with 
dangerous or unu[s]ual weapons, is a crime again[s]t the public peace, by terrifying the good 
people of the land.”); TOULMIN, supra note 110, at 5  (“[T]here may be an affray, where there 
is no actual violence; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in 
such a manner as will naturally cause terror to the people.”); THE SALEM GAZETTE, June 2, 
1818, at 4 (“As it is well known to be an offence against law to ride or go armed with . . . 
firelocks, or other dangerous weapons, it cannot be doubted that the vigilant police officers . . . 
will arre[s]t [violators] . . . . ” ). 
 
177
 See Martin, supra note 166, at 61; A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, supra note 166, at 33. 
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constable oath.178  Meanwhile, treatises touching upon the power of local magistrates 
often carried forward portions of Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown.179  Certainly, the 
variance of rules on statutory construction can provide any good attorney with 
different interpretations for each version.180  One may claim statutes that prohibited 
going “armed offensively” speak more to reckless conduct rather than the act of 
“going armed” itself.   At the same time, one may also claim the same language 
serves as a prohibition on offensive weapons.181  As John Bond wrote in A Compleat 
Guide for Justices of Peace, the Statute of Northampton stands for the legal 
proposition that “Persons with offensive Weapons in Fairs, Markets or elsewhere in 
Affray of the King’s People, may be arrested by the Sheriff, or other the King’s 
Officers[.]”182 
A similar understanding of the police power and common law was conveyed by 
Gloucester, Massachusetts.  On June 12, 1809, the town resolved the formation of a 
Committee of Public Safety, empowering it: 
[T]o [s]uppre[s]s all di[s]turbers of the peace, and notice every abu[s]e 
offered by any individual, or combination of men, patrolling our [s]treets 
                                                          
 
178
 For the oath, see A HELP TO MAGISTRATES, supra note 128, at 107 (“[Y]ou [s]hall 
Arre[s]t all [s]uch Per[s]ons as in your [s]ight or pre[s]ence [s]hall Ride or go Armed 
Offen[s]ively . . . and other [s]u[s]pected Per[s]ons, and of [s]uch as go Armed, and the like . . 
. .”); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS; OR, A GUIDE FOR JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, AND CORONERS, 
CONSTABLES, JURY-MEN, OVER-SEERS OF THE POOR, SURVEYORS OF HIGH-WAYS, GOVERNORS OF 
FAIRS, GAOLERS, &C. 79-80 (n.p. 1711) (same); THE BOOK OF OATHS, AND THE SEVERAL FORMS 
THEROF, BOTH ANCIENT AND MODERN, FAITHFULLY COLLECTED OUT OF SUNDRY AUTHENTICK 
BOOKS OF RECORDS 207 (1715) (“You [s]hall are[s]t all [s]uch per[s]ons as in your [s]ight or 
pre[s]ence [s]hall ride or go armed offen[s]ively, or [s]hall commit, or make any Riot, Affray, 
or other breach of his Maje[s]ty’s Peace . . . .”).  For some statutes that followed this 
construction, see ACTS AND LAWS, OF HIS MAJESTY’S PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 
IN NEW ENGLAND 11 (n.p. 1726) (to arrest “such as shall Ride, or go Armed Offensively before 
any of Their Majesties Justices, or other Their Officers or Ministers doing their Office, or 
elsewhere, by Night or by Day, in Fear or Affray of Their Majesties Liege People.”).  For 
some examples of a colony adopting the oath to appoint constables, see A COLLECTION OF ALL 
THE PUBLIC ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, OF THE PROVINCE OF NORTH-CAROLINA: NOW IN USE AND 
FORCE 131-32 (James Davis ed., Newbern, 1752); ACTS AND LAWS OF HIS MAJESTY’S 
PROVINCE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE, IN NEW-ENGLAND 2 . (Daniel Fowle ed., Portsmouth, 1761). 
 
179
 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 176, at 148-49; JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 358 (4th ed., Dublin, 1793). 
 
180
 See supra note 110 for discussion on different constructions on “dangerous and 
unusual” and “dangerous or unusual” weapons. 
 
181
 For some examples of what constituted as “offensive weapons,” see Proclamation by 
the King, LONDON CHRONICLE, Feb. 14, 1735, at 1 (including “Fire Arms” as constituting 
“offen[s]ive Weapons”); THE ACTS OF THE ASSEMBLY, NOW IN FORCE, IN THE COLONY OF 
VIRGINIA 54 (Williamsburg, W. Rind, A. Purdie, and J. Dixon 1769) (defining “offensive 
weapons” to include “Guns” and “Ammunition”); WILLIAM PATTERSON, LAWS OF THE STATE 
OF NEW JERSEY, REVISED AND PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEGISLATURE 410 
(n.p. 1800) (defining “offensive weapons” to include “any pistol, hanger, cutlass, bludgeon”). 
 
182
 JAMES BOND, A COMPLEAT GUIDE FOR JUSTICES OF PEACE 42 (3d ed., London, 1707) 
(emphasis added); see also id. at 181 (“A person going or riding with offensive Arms may be 
arrested by a Constable, and by him be brought before a Justice.”). 
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and wharves, having offen[s]ive weapons, either by night or day, to the 
annoyance and terror of the inhabitants; and have them apprehended and 
puni[s]hed at the expence of the town . . . .183 
Whichever interpretation one wants to deduce from the different constructions, it 
does not displace the original meaning of the Statute of Northampton nor the fact 
that States continued to adopt its tenets after the ratification of the Constitution, even 
if in different forms.  This continued well into the nineteenth century through 
different State criminal codes.184   Thus, if we are to deduce anything from these 
different constructions it is that regulating of public arms to preserve the peace is 
part of our Anglo-American tradition.  This includes prohibiting dangerous weapons 
“among the great Concourse of the People.”185 
While detractors will continue to claim the Statute was understood to regulate 
dangerous or unusual conduct with arms, this interpretation is solely based on a 
flawed reading of Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown186 and Sir John Knight’s case.187  To 
date, no historian has found any substantiating evidence supporting the Second 
Amendment extended to preparatory self-defense among the public concourse.  Such 
claims are based on a mythical Second Amendment rather than historical reality.  
Certainly, as a matter of individual political virtue, there is nothing wrong with 
advocating to government that one should have the option to armed defense outside 
the home.  The entire basis of our republican government is that the people have a 
vested property interest in preserving their liberty through the political process.188   
However, as a matter of constitutional doctrine in the eighteenth century discourse, a 
preparatory individual self-defense right to bear arms in the public concourse was 
non-existent. 
This does not mean that the Statute of Northampton should be interpreted as 
prohibiting gun owners from transporting firearms for lawful purposes such as to 
                                                          
 
183
 BOSTON GAZETTE, January 16, 1809, at 2 (emphasis added).  The resolves were 
published throughout the United States.  See AMERICAN CITIZEN, January 19, 1809, at 2; 
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL, January 19, 1809, at 3; FEDERAL REPUBLICAN AND COMMERCIAL 
GAZETTE, January 23, 1809, at 2; CITY GAZETTE AND DAILY ADVERTISER, March 7, 1809, at 2. 
 
184
 For some examples in treatises, see 1 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON 
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 392 (5th ed., n.p. 1877) (“[A] man cannot excuse the wearing 
such armour in public by alleging that a person threatened him”); FRANCIS WHARTON, A 
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 527-28 (Philadelphia 1846) 
(confirming its enforcement in several states and that a “man cannot excuse the wearing such 
armor in public, by alleging that such a one threatened him”). 
 
185
 JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 13 (Newburn, 
James Davis 1774). 
 
186
 Compare Charles, Scribble Scrabble supra note 20, at 237-39, with Volokh, The First 
and Second Amendments, supra note 41, at 102;  see also supra pp. 7-8 (discussing how 
Volokh and other scholars often confuse the statutory exceptions with the general rule). 
 
187
 See Kopel and Cramer, State Standards of Review for the Right to the Keep and Bear 
Arms, supra note 38, at 1127, 1133-34; Hardy, District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald 
v. City of Chicago, supra note 39, at 205. 
 
188
 Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” In Our Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 490-502. 
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State or federally sponsored militia service,189 shooting ranges, a new residence, or to 
purchase and sell firearms.190  Even a seventeenth century American prohibition 
statutorily permitted the transportation of arms from “Strangers, Travelling upon 
their lawful Occasions thro’ this Province, behaving themselves peaceably.”191  What 
the Statute of Northampton primarily stands for is preventing the carrying or use of 
dangerous arms among the concourse of the people, for in these instances one’s 
personal security is divesting with a well-regulated society. 
D.  The Statute of Northampton in Nineteenth Century America 
In Ezell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that arms 
regulation in the mid- to late-nineteenth century should be utilized when deciphering 
the protective scope of the Second Amendment as it applies to the States.192  The 
opinion is the first in two historical aspects.  First, a federal court has never applied a 
separate historical test for the Bill of Rights to the States as to the federal 
government.  Second, a court has never deduced original meaning from the year the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified when interpreting the 1791 Bill of Rights.193   
Given these two facts, it is unlikely that the Ezell opinion will gain the majority 
in the next Second Amendment case before the Supreme Court.  However, should 
this legal test survive and be adopted by a Court majority, the historical record 
provides substantiated evidence that the tenets of the Statute of Northampton 
survived well into the nineteenth century.194   
                                                          
 
189
 See generally Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated” Militia, 
supra note 19 (discussing the founding generation’s understanding of rights associated with 
militia arms bearing); Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, the Second Amendment, and 
Individual Militia Rights, supra note 17. 
 
190
 Don B. Kates’s initial stance comports with the Anglo-American origins of regulating 
arms.  See Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra note 6, at  267. 
 
191
 THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-
JERSEY, supra note 170, at 290. 
 
192
 Ezell v. Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 
193
 The opinion by Judge Diane S. Sykes is also troubling in that it only endorses originalist 
scholarship that purports a rather broad based Second Amendment without accepting the 
founding generation’s regulations on public safety.  Id. at 12 n.11 (not citing to one Ph.D. 
historian that specializes in either eighteenth century or nineteenth century history or to 
originalist scholarship endorsed by the historical academy).  This is not the first time that 
Judge Sykes has refused to take into account the entire historical record.  See United States v. 
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 645-54 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (relying solely on the 
works of scholars that interpret the Second Amendment broadly).  This form of historical 
inquiry runs counter to both Justice Stevens’ dissent and Justice Scalia’s concurrence in 
McDonald. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3117 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(showing concern that a pure historical approach could still lead to judicial bias, because 
judges will not know which “pieces to credit and which to discount, and then . . . assemble 
them into a coherent whole.”); id. at 3057-58 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating the historical 
inquiry is whether “any historical methodology, under any plausible standard of proof, would 
lead to the same conclusion.”). 
 
194
 See supra notes 182-85 and RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND THE 
PARISH OFFICER 29-31 (21st ed., A. Strahan, London, 1810); WILLIAM WALTER HENING, THE 
NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 49-50 (3d ed., J. & G. Cochran, Richmond, 1820). 
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This is best supported by the only two State courts that examined the Statute as a 
historical guidepost to understanding the protective scope of the right to bear arms.195  
The first such case was State v. Huntly, before the North Carolina Supreme Court in 
1843.196  One of the issues before the court was whether the Statute of Northampton 
was still in force as a lawful restriction on the carrying of arms.  Writing for the 
court, Judge William Joseph Gaston correctly traced the Statute’s origins through the 
English common law: 
Indeed, if those acts [of going armed or committing affrays] be deemed by 
the common law crimes and misdemeanors, which are in violation of the 
public rights and of the duties owing to the community in its social 
capacity, it is difficult to imagine any which more unequivocally deserve 
to be so considered than the acts charged upon this defendant. They attack 
directly that public order and sense of security, which it is one of the first 
objeets [sic] of the common law, and ought to be of the law of all 
regulated societies, to preserve inviolate--and they lead almost necessarily 
to actual violenee [sic]. Nor can it for a moment be supposed, that such 
acts are less mischievous here or less the proper subjects of legal 
reprehension, than they were in the country of our ancestors. The bill of 
rights in this State secures to every man indeed, the right to “bear arms for 
the defence of the State.” While it secures to him a right of which he 
cannot be deprived, it holds forth the duty in execution of which that right 
is to be exercised.197 
Not only does Gaston’s opinion coincide with the original intent of the Statute of 
Northampton,198 but it also perfectly captures the balance between liberty, security, 
and happiness as the founding generation understood it.199  The preservation of all 
three rested on the laws of republican government or a well-regulated society.  To 
characterize eighteenth century constitutionalism otherwise is to misunderstand the 
correlation between a representative government, laws, and constitutions.   
Detractors will claim Gaston stated “the carrying of a gun, per se, constitutes no 
offence,”200 thus the preparatory carrying of arms was viewed as constitutionally 
protected as long for it did not terrify the people.201  This interpretation fails upon 
reading the next sentence.  Gaston expressly conditioned public arms carrying for 
lawful purposes such as “business or amusement,” making no mention of any self-
                                                          
 
195
 For more on the use of historical guideposts when evaluating the Second Amendment, 
see Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald: 
“Historical Guideposts” and the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2 
AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 7, 21-30. 
 
196
 State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. 418, 421-22 (3 Ired. 1843). 
 
197
 Id. 
 
198
 See supra Part I. 
 
199
 See Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” In Our 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 477-517. 
 
200
 Huntly, 25 N.C. at 422. 
 
201
 See Kopel and Cramer, State Standards of Review for the Right to the Keep and Bear 
Arms, supra note 38, at 1133-34. 
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defense exceptions.202  The reference to lawful purposes undoubtedly acknowledged 
the State’s police power over public arms bearing to preserve the peace.  In other 
words, Gatson foresaw instances where a person may have been carrying the firearm 
for transport to a residence or location, repair, hunting, or to attend a militia muster.  
It was in these latter instances that the carrying constituted no crime per se.  
However, the common law offense of carrying arms without the authority of 
government was still punishable by law.  The question that the court had to ask 
before it determined a violation of the Statute of Northampton is: “Why was the 
person carrying the arm?”    If the carrying was for a lawful purpose, there was no 
violation.203  However, if it was to merely carry arms among the public concourse it 
would be a violation of the Statute.204 
In 1872, the Texas Supreme Court was the other nineteenth century State court to 
evaluate the Statute of Northampton.  In English v. State, Judge Moses B. Walker 
examined the constitutionality of a Texas law prohibiting the carrying of deadly 
weapons in public to include “pistols, dirks, daggers, slungshots, swordcanes, spears, 
brass-knuckles, and bowie knives.”205  Using the Statute of Northampton as a 
historical guidepost, Walker wrote: 
It will doubtless work a great improvement in the moral and social 
condition of men, when every man shall come fully to understand that, in 
the great social compact under and by which states and communities are 
bound and held together, each individual has compromised the right to 
avenge his own wrongs, and must look to the state for redress. We must 
not go back to that state of barbarism in which each claims the right to 
administer the law in his own case; that law being simply the domination 
of the strong and the violent over the weak and submissive. 
 
It is useless to talk about personal liberty being infringed by laws such 
as that under consideration. The world has seen too much licentiousness 
cloaked under the name of natural or personal liberty; natural and 
personal liberty are exchanged, under the social compact of states, for 
civil liberty. 
 
The powers of government are intended to operate upon the civil 
conduct of the citizen; and whenever his conduct becomes such as to 
offend against public morals or public decency, it comes within the range 
of legislative authority. How far the functions of police may be extended 
                                                          
 
202
 Huntly, 25 N.C. at 422. 
 
203
 The North Carolina Supreme Court was not articulating a new legal principle in 
adjudicating gun control offenses.  In the early eighteenth century, the King’s Bench gave a 
similar rationale when interpreting the 1706 Game Act.  See Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman 
(1752), in 1 REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF THE KING’S BENCH 15 (1751-
1756), (Joseph Sayer ed., W. Strahan & M. Woodfall, London, 1775); id. at 16; 6 Ann. c. 16, 
§ 6 (1706) (Eng.).  The rationale being the possession of a gun did not automatically constitute 
a violation of the statute per se, for the person could be keeping or carrying it for a lawful 
purpose.  See Charles, Arms For Their Defence?, supra note 34, at 396-97. 
 
204
 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). 
 
205
 English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 474 (1872). 
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to govern the conduct of men—how far personal liberty may be restrained 
for the prevention of crime, are nice questions; yet, says one of the ablest 
thinkers of modern times, John Stewart Mill, in his work on Liberty . . . 
“It is one of the undisputed functions of government, to take precautions 
against crime before it has been committed, as well as to detect and 
punish afterwards. The right inherent in society to ward off crimes against 
itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the 
maxim, ‘that purely self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be 
meddled with in the way of prevention or punishment.’”206 
 
 Here, again, we see an opinion that took into account the original intent of 
the Statute of Northampton and the interrelation between liberty and republican 
government as the founding generation understood it.  The entire purpose of such 
prohibitions was to ensure the public safety or peace.  Indeed, constitutional rights 
embody cores that the legislature may never infringe, yet conduct falling outside this 
core could be regulated in the interest of the public good.207  In the case of the 
Second Amendment, there is no historical evidence to suggest the “core” of the right 
to armed self-defense superseded the community’s safety concerns or the tenets of 
the Statute of Northampton.208  An 1837 charge to the grand jury, delivered by Judge 
Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, illustrates this point: 
In our own Commonwealth [of Massachusetts], no person may go armed 
with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous 
weapon, without reasonable cause to apprehend an assault or violence to 
his person, family, or property.  Where the practice of wearing secret arms 
prevails, it indicates either that the laws are bad; or that they are not 
executed with vigor; or, at least, it proves want of confidence in their 
protection.  It often leads to the sudden commission of acts of atrocious 
injury; and induces the individual to rely for defence on himself, rather 
than on society.  But how vain and impotent is the power of a single arm, 
however skilled in the science of defence, to protect its possessor from the 
many evil persons who infest society.  The possession of a concealed 
dagger is apt to produce an elation of mind, which raises itself about the 
dictates both of prudence and law.  The possessor, stimulated by a 
sensitive notion of honor, and constituting himself the sole judge of his 
rights, may suddenly commit a deed; for which a life of penitence will 
hardly, even in his own estimation, atone.  When you survey the society 
to which you belong, and consider the various wants of its members;—
their numbers, their variety of occupation and character,—their 
conflicting interests and wants . . . what is it, permit me to ask, preserves 
the common peace and safety?  I know of no answer, but THE LAW:–it is 
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the law, which makes every man to know his own place, compelling him 
to move in it, and giving him his due.209 
Clearly, the legal tenets imbedded in the Statute of Northampton survived, which 
is further evidenced by nineteenth century commentators such as Francis Wharton,210 
William Oldnall Russell,211 and James Kent.212  Throughout the nineteenth century 
numerous States enacted different versions.213  In fact, a variation of the Statute was 
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even adopted as far west as the Oregon Territory.   In 1853 Oregon criminal law 
stipulated: 
If any persons shall go armed with dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other 
offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an 
assault, injury, or other violence to his person, or to his family or 
property, he may, on complaint of any other person, having reasonable 
cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be required to find sureties 
for keeping the peace for a term not exceeding six months, with the right 
of appealing as before provided.214 
Like the Statute of Northampton, the Oregon provision prohibited the public 
carrying of arms.215  However, the provision was unique in that allowed a defense of 
“reasonable” fear from assault.  Certainly, a person could not claim the defense as an 
everyday preparatory measure,216 but it does show the variations of public carry 
statutes that developed in the United States.  Perhaps, most importantly, it gives 
constitutional credence to modern statutes prohibiting the carrying of arms unless 
there is a showing of immediate danger.217 
III.  HISTORICAL GUIDEPOSTS VERSUS OTHER SECOND AMENDMENT STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW 
As Part I details, the historical evidence of public arms regulation is compelling.  
The text, original understanding, and history reveal that the Statute of Northampton 
served as a prohibition on the carrying of arms among the public concourse. 
Contrary to the claim of historian Joyce Lee Malcolm and those misled by her 
research, its provisions were enforced by local constables, sheriffs, bailiffs, and 
magistrates from its inception and even became a staple in American jurisprudence.    
Detractors will claim there is no evidence of such prohibitions being enforced in 
seventeenth and eighteenth century America, thus the Statute of Northampton should 
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not be a guidepost in determining the protective scope of the Second Amendment 
outside the home.218  What this type of ad-hoc historical rebuttal fails to take into 
account is the Statute was a misdemeanor and enforced by local government 
officials.    The fact of the matter is that eighteenth century local records were not 
maintained to the standard they are today and misdemeanors were rarely brought 
before any court. Absent the finding of numerous detailed records concerning 
eighteenth century fines or local imprisonment for misdemeanors, tracking the 
Statute’s enforcement is nearly impossible.  This does not mean, however, that the 
Statute of Northampton was never enforced.  If anything, the Statute’s survival in 
constable oaths, American treatises, and its adoption by numerous colonial and State 
assemblies affirms its role in our eighteenth and nineteenth century legal system.   
Not to mention, this type of fake historical assessment or faux originalism could 
be used to extinguish other traditional eighteenth century laws as constitutionally 
unimportant.219  In other words, courts need to be mindful and maintain a sense of 
historical consciousness when advocates make generalizations about the 
enforcement or meaning of earlier laws.220  It is often too easy for advocates to 
mitigate our past by falsely claiming founding era rights existed under a presumption 
of liberty or that the founding generation did not adhere to well-known legal 
tenets.221  Instead of accepting these ad-hoc historical surveys under the guise of 
originalism, the courts need to rely on accepted historical works and methodologies 
to understand eighteenth century constitutionalism and law as a collective whole if 
we are to examine rights under any form of originalist inquiry.  As Judge Ilana 
Rovner wrote in an Ezell v. Chicago concurrence:  
If [the courts] are to acknowledge the historical context and the values of 
the period when the Second and Fourteenth Amendments were adopted, 
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then we must accept and apply the full understanding of the citizenry at 
that time.222 
This begets the question: “What does the Statute of Northampton provide us in 
terms of evaluating the protective scope of the Second Amendment outside the 
home?”  The answer is armed individual self-defense outside the home deserves only 
minimalist protection or categorical exclusion.223  The Statute’s tenets provide the 
courts with a longstanding philosophical and ideological restriction on the “bearing” 
of arms as the founding generation understood it.224  The remaining jurisprudential 
question ultimately rests on whether the arms prohibited are lethal or non-lethal.  If 
the arms are lethal, the Statute serves as a sufficient historical guidepost to prohibit 
their use among the public concourse.  However, if the arms are non-lethal, there 
may be a plausible argument that their inability to harm the community or breach the 
peace permits their use as a reasonable means to exercise an individual’s right to 
self-defense. 
Again, the Statute should not be historically interpreted as prohibiting the 
transport of arms—lethal or non-lethal—for lawful purposes.  In order for “the 
people” to exercise the Heller right of armed individual self-defense in the home,225 
one must be able to reasonably transport the firearm to and from the shooting range.  
At the same time, individuals must be able to reasonably transport firearms to a new 
residence, to government sanctioned militia service,226 or to purchase and sell lawful 
firearms. 
Naturally, the historical guidepost approach to adjudicating the Second 
Amendment is not the only one available to the courts.  There exist two other 
popular theories to adjudicating the Second Amendment outside the home.  The first 
is a libertarian individual balancing approach, which gives equal weight to individual 
interests to that of the community.  The second approach is importing First 
Amendment jurisprudence into the Second.  Each approach will be addressed in turn 
and weighed against historical guideposts. 
A.  The Problems with Libertarian Approaches to Second Amendment Jurisprudence 
In 2009, Eugene Volokh published what has come to be an influential work on 
adjudicating Second Amendment claims entitled Implementing the Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and Research Agenda.227  
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To date, the work has been cited by the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals respectively,228 and proved influential in the 
Fourth Circuit to at least state that armed individual self-defense must extend beyond 
the home.229  The basis of Volokh’s framework rests on a libertarian interest 
balancing approach in terms of individual burdens: 
Whenever people are in the prohibited places--places where they have a 
right to be, and often have a practical need to be--they are barred from 
protecting themselves with a firearm. 
And of course people’s ability to protect themselves elsewhere is no 
substitute for their ability to protect themselves where they are. Some 
rights, such as free speech, may be only slightly burdened by laws that bar 
speech in some places but allow it in many other places. But self-defense 
has to take place wherever the person happens to be.   Nearly any 
prohibition on having arms for self-defense in a particular place . . . is a 
substantial burden on the right to bear arms for self-defense. Perhaps the 
burden can be justified on scope or danger reduction grounds, but it is 
indeed a serious burden.230 
By no means does Volokh claim the Second Amendment outside the home can 
constitutionally extend everywhere.  He concedes that gun bans at airports and 
courthouses are only a “modest burden on lawful self-defense, perhaps low enough 
to fall below the constitutional threshold.”231  However, all other bans to include 
open and conceal carry, carrying in places where alcohol is served, private property, 
public streets and sidewalks, schools, and some government property are substantial 
burdens the Second Amendment, and perhaps unconstitutional.232   
The main problem with adopting Volokh’s jurisprudential approach is its raises 
the interest of the individual above the interests of society.  This is a historically 
unattainable position, for it flips the Statute of Northampton on its head.  Indeed, 
there are public policy arguments to be made concerning the benefits of armed 
individual self-defense outside the home, but this policy choice cannot be claimed as 
a constitutional right, nor does it not coincide with the founding generation’s 
understanding of a well-regulated society and public arms carrying.233   
To its credit, Volokh’s analytical framework submits to any “historical 
exclusion” on “certain places” as a means to lessen the burden.  If this is the case 
then the text, original intent, and history of the Statute of Northampton provide the 
guidepost by which to work from.  It is here, however, that Volokh takes a stance 
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that does not comport with the historical record.  He claims that the wearing or 
carrying of “common weapons” in the “common fashion” is part of the Anglo-
American tradition.234  As shown in Part I, this interpretation is historically 
indefensible. 
Naturally, Volokh is not the only person to take a libertarian approach when 
adjudicating the Second Amendment.  Josh Blackman asserts a similar stance by 
classifying the Second Amendment in terms of “social costs.”235  In particular, he 
takes issue with singling out the Second Amendment as the “most dangerous right” 
if the Supreme Court has recognized that other forms of liberty “yield negative 
externalities.”236  For this reason Blackman advocates for the adjudicating of all 
enumerated rights by balancing individual liberty interests against society’s need for 
safety and security: 
The presumption should be that an enumerated, fundamental right in our 
Constitution that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” 
should be treated equally to other such important rights. Those aiming to 
detract from this standard bear the burden of establishing a disparate 
treatment, not the other way around. The scales of rights should be set at 
equipoise, and balance in a similar fashion liberty interests and social 
costs . . . .237 
In response to those jurists that purport to extend a presumption of 
constitutionality to the Second Amendment, particularly to the “longstanding 
prohibitions” listed by the Heller majority, Blackman writes: 
[The] presumption of constitutionality restricts the ability of the Second 
Amendment to flourish alongside its brethren in the Bill of Rights. 
Although Justice Scalia remarks that “there will be time enough to 
expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we have 
mentioned,” he provides no historical rationale, whatsoever, for the 
“longstanding prohibitions” dicta.238 
Few, if any, jurists will disagree with Blackman that fundamental rights deserve 
constitutional protection.  At the same time though, each constitutional right 
maintains a distinct and unique historical pedigree based upon numerous factors.  
This includes the rich history of the Second Amendment.  To date, the Supreme 
Court has applied said history to recognize the Second Amendment as protecting two 
core rights.  The first is the right of “the people” to possess handguns for self-
defense at home.  Although the Second Amendment does not expressly state this 
right, the Heller Court took a historical guidepost approach by tracing it through our 
Anglo-American origins239 and contemporaneous State analogues.240  Meanwhile, the 
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second core right is that of participating in the common defense in a “well-regulated 
militia” force;241 an interpretation that finds considerable support in the historical 
record.242   
Given the Supreme Court found both of these cores to be rooted in historical 
tradition, it makes little sense to carve out new Second Amendment rights by 
discarding history and weighing a new test that balances social costs.243  
Furthermore, in terms of actual “social costs” to the safety of the community, 
Blackman never weighs the potential dangers imposed by public arms bearing as 
understood by the founding generation with that of modern society.  If we are to 
truly import “social costs” as a jurisprudential matter, it is imperative that jurists at 
least consider the constitutionality of modern gun control regulations in relation to 
1791,244 for changes in technology have substantially increased the potential dangers 
associated with the public carrying of firearms that legislatures take into account. 
To begin with this approach, the historical record provides substantial evidence 
that the discharging of firearms within populated areas could be prohibited as a 
means to ensure public safety.245  In 1768 the Boston Town Council, in particular, 
adopted such a regulation because its “inhabitants have been lately surprised and 
endangered by the firing of Muskets charged with Shot or Ball on the Neck, 
Common, and other Parts of the Town[.]”246  Two decades later, the town of 
Newburyport, Massachusetts followed suit and passed an ordinance outlawing the 
discharging of firearms, excepting the lawful purpose of organized militia musters 
controlled by State officers: 
That no person (excepting the militia, when under arms, on muster-days, 
and by the command of their officer) shall fire off any sort of gun, pistol . 
. .  or other thing charged or composed in whole, or in part of gun-powder, 
in array of the streets, lanes or public ways in this town, nor so near as to 
affright any horse, or in any sort tend to affright, annoy or injury any 
person whatever—nor shall any person discharge at a mark or otherwise 
any gun, charged with ball, at any time or front of any place within this 
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town, nor in any direction but such only as from time to time shall be 
approved of and licensed by the town, or by the select-men thereof.247 
What can be deduced in terms of eighteenth “social costs” from these provisions?  
The answer is the prevention of negligent discharges by single-shot firearms was 
deemed suitable in the interests of the public good, and during an era where 
maintaining a loaded and properly charged firearm could be compromised by the 
surrounding conditions.248  Most importantly, it comes at a point in history when the 
standard rifleman could discharge, on average, two or three rounds per minute 
dependent upon the skill of the shooter.249  Thus, given the technology available to 
the founding generation, we can calculate the eighteenth century “social cost” 
associated with firearms at a ratio of two potential deaths per minute.250 
Now in terms of modern firearms, a standard handgun can fire anywhere between 
six (standard 357 magnum revolver) to over a dozen bullets (standard magazine-
loaded handgun), and can be easily loaded in seconds.  Thus, a low “social cost” 
estimate ranges the modern handgun between the ratio of twelve and twenty-four 
potential deaths per minute, with a trained marksman capable of effectuating as high 
as forty-eight potential deaths per minute. 251  This death per minute ratio is well 
beyond the “social cost” equivalent of an eighteenth century riot, which was 
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unquestionably prohibited by law in the interests of public safety.252  Not even an 
eighteenth century cannon could successfully achieve a “social cost” ratio that high.   
The purpose of providing this historical parallel is not to limit the types of arms 
that may be acquired in accordance with the Second Amendment.  This is an entirely 
separate constitutional issue in itself, and it is well-settled in our constitutional 
jurisprudence that rights must evolve with accepted technologies.253  Instead, the 
historical point is the actual “social costs” associated with firearms has risen 
exponentially since the late eighteenth century, and this does not even include 
substantial demographic changes by comparing eighteenth and twenty-first century 
census or population data.  To phrase it another way, if the founding generation 
believed it legally sufficient to prohibit going armed among the public concourse 
with a two deaths per minute ratio, it is difficult to question the constitutionally of 
prohibiting arms that measure at a twelve, twenty-four, or as high as forty-eight 
potential deaths per minute. 
The last libertarian approach to adjudicating Second Amendment rights is a 
mythical take on Blackstone’s Commentaries.  It claims that the English 
Constitution, at least as William Blackstone understood it, conveys a right to carry 
arms for “protection against violence in public.”254  This ahistorical conclusion is 
reached by classifying the 1689 Declaration of Rights “have arms” provision as an 
auxiliary right “‘which serve principally as barriers to protect and maintain inviolate 
the three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private 
property.’”255 
The problem with this approach is it recasts Blackstone’s understanding of 
auxiliary rights under an individualized libertarian paradigm; an interpretation that 
does not comport with the historical record.  Blackstone never equated auxiliary 
rights with individual civil rights.  Instead, he defined auxiliary rights as the means 
to ensure that civil rights are “ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of the 
laws, if the constitution [provides] no other method to secure their actual 
enjoyment.”256  Blackstone’s reference to the English Constitution is telling, for it 
illuminates that auxiliary rights are those constitutional mediums that are intimately 
connected with the administration of government, not the individual exertions of the 
people. 
In the case of the right to “have arms,” it is listed as the “fifth and last auxiliary 
right.”257   This means that four auxiliary rights precede the deployment of the “right 
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of self-preservation and resistance.”  The first auxiliary right is Parliament’s exercise 
of its powers; the second is through the sovereign; and the third is by the courts of 
justice.258  When those fail, resort may be had to the fourth auxiliary right: the right 
to petition Parliament or the King for the “redress of grievances.”259  And only after 
that right is exhausted may the people resort to “have arms.” Thus, in Blackstone’s 
construct, the Declaration’s guarantees–the right to petition and the allowance to 
“have arms”–are means by which individuals preserve and protect their liberties if 
Parliament, the sovereign, the courts, and their right to petition fail them.260   
Perhaps it can be asserted that the Heller majority interpreted Blackstone as 
supporting the English right to arms as divorced from militia service,261 thus his 
treatise should be extended to support public arms bearing as a means to preserve 
individual security, life, and property.  This argument fails for two historical reasons.  
First, as discussed above, this interpretation cannot survive if the Supreme Court is 
to use history as a contextual guidepost.262  One needs to look no further than the 
contemporary works of Jean Louis De Lolme and Francis Plowden to understand 
Blackstone’s view of auxiliary rights.263  Second, Blackstone expressly identified the 
Statute of Northampton as being a lawful restraint on the use of arms,264 meaning the 
text, original intent, and history of the Statute supersedes any ahistorical libertarian 
conclusion.265 
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B.  The Problems with First Amendment Approaches to Second Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court recognized a jurisprudential 
link between the First and Second Amendments.266  Given the Court had taken 150 
years to incorporate the First Amendment to the States,267  the Court found nothing 
out of the ordinary in recognizing the Second Amendment as a “individual right” 
divorced from militia service.  Other than this minor historical link, the Court gave 
no inclination that First Amendment jurisprudence should provide the vehicle to 
adjudicate the Second. 
Still, numerous courts are drawing jurisprudential parallels between the two 
Amendments.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed “with those who 
advocate looking to the First Amendment as a guide in developing a standard of 
review for the Second Amendment.”268  The Third Circuit felt the guidance of the 
First Amendment provided the “natural choice,” for “Heller itself repeatedly invokes 
the First Amendment in establishing principles governing the Second 
Amendment.”269  Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit followed the lead of the Third and 
Fourth Circuits, stating: 
[The court] can distill this First Amendment doctrine and extrapolate a 
few general principles to the Second Amendment context.  First, a severe 
burden on the core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense will 
require an extremely strong public-interest justification and a close fit 
between the government's means and its end.  Second, laws restricting 
activity lying closer to the margins of the Second Amendment right, laws 
that merely regulate rather than restrict, and modest burdens on the right 
may be more easily justified.  How much more easily depends on the 
relative severity of the burden and its proximity to the core of the right.270 
Certainly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the two Amendments as 
embodying individual rights, but so too does the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eighth Amendments respectively.  This begets numerous questions, such as why not 
incorporate or apply any of the other Amendment’s jurisprudential approaches?  Are 
the First and Second Amendments historically linked as to require the courts to adapt 
the latter to the former?  In what ways do the First and Second Amendments differ in 
terms of the Anglo-American tradition?   
Perhaps the answer to the first question rests with the judiciary’s familiarity with 
First Amendment doctrine.  As Joseph Blocher informs us, “First Amendment 
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doctrine is comfortingly familiar, and courts almost certainly will continue to rely on 
it--probably explicitly so--as they attempt to address the seemingly parallel problems 
arising under the Second Amendment.”271  Familiarity aside, the different conduct 
associated with the First and Second Amendments makes it difficult to import First 
Amendment doctrine wholesale.  It purports to “muddle” rather than “clarify” 
Second Amendment analysis.272  
In fact, it is difficult to ascertain how any court could even infer the Supreme 
Court acquiesced to importing First Amendment jurisprudence to the Second.  As 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Andre M. Davis astutely points out: 
Heller does refer to the First Amendment, but only for several quite 
limited purposes: (1) to compare its language, along with that of other 
amendments in the Bill of Rights, to the language of the Second 
Amendment; (2) to establish that constitutional rights are not limited to 
the use of equipment available at the time of ratification, but extend to 
modern analogues; (3) to make the simple point that unqualified 
constitutional language does not imply an “unlimited” right; (4) to note 
that initial recognition of a right sometimes comes long after ratification; 
and finally, (5) to remind its audience that our constitutional rights are 
“the very product of an interest-balancing by the people” and thus that 
balancing them away in the manner ascribed to Justice Breyer would be 
inappropriate. Certainly the First Amendment, as a fount of rights the 
dissenting Justices have frequently championed, was a useful source for 
the Heller majority. But these limited references are hardly an invitation 
to import the First Amendment’s idiosyncratic doctrines wholesale into a 
Second Amendment context, where, without a link to expressive conduct, 
they will often appear unjustified.273 
There is also a historical problem with importing First Amendment 
Jurisprudence.  This problem being the legal tenets of the First Amendment has 
never been remotely associated with the Second.274  From its Anglo origins through 
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51Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
52 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1 
 
the Early Republic, no one ever attributed the ideological or political origins of free 
speech, religion, or the press as akin to armed self-defense.  If anything, the two are 
complete opposites, for the First Amendment prohibits prior restraint and eighteenth 
century gun control embraced prior restraint to preserve the peace.   
Perhaps one can claim that both Amendments embody natural rights and should 
be adjudicated as such.  Unfortunately, this approach fails to take into account the 
public utility associated with each respective right as the founding generation 
understood it.  As was seen with the history Statute of Northampton, prohibitions on 
going armed and even discharging firearms were deemed as a lawful prior restraint 
in the interests of public safety.275  In fact, the carrying or use firearms in public 
required a governmental license in many instances.276 
To put it another way, the historical evidence does not reveal that the founding 
generation placed the utility of armed individual self-defense in the public concourse 
as superior to the interests of the community at large.  No one ever questioned these 
prohibitions as an infringement on the natural right of self-defense or the right to 
bear arms.  In fact, no historian, legal scholar, or originalist has found any 
seventeenth or eighteenth century newspaper editorials, correspondence, pamphlets, 
or books that purport otherwise.277  Hypothetically speaking, even if a few examples 
are to appear, it does not detract from the Anglo-American tradition on prohibiting 
arms among the public concourse.   
In contrast to the Second Amendment, the public utility afforded by the First 
Amendment is well documented from the late seventeenth century and through the 
Early Republic.  In the case of a free press, it was the deemed the basis of all other 
liberties.278  This is because it served as the medium by which the people 
communicated to their government, and the government communicated to the 
people.279  As eighteenth century political philosopher David Hume informs us, all 
mixed governments required “foregoing observation” through the “liberty of the 
                                                          
 
275
 See supra Part I. 
 
276
 See supra pp. 10-11, 23-24, 42. 
 
277
 This is not to say that Second Amendment scholars have not inferred this right existed 
by stating the Second Amendment protects against public violence.  See HALBROOK, THE 
FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 9, at 20, 98, 108, 137, 158.  For a reply of 
Halbrook’s recasting of eighteenth century perceptions of armed self-defense, see William G. 
Merkel, Heller as Hubris, and How McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change the 
Constitutional World as We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221, 1258-61 (2010). 
 
278
 See The Freedom of the Press, THE HERALD OF FREEDOM (Boston, MA), May 21, 1790, 
at pg. 77, col. 3 (“It was the saying of an ancient and wise Englishman [Matthew] Tindal who 
lived at the time of the glorious revolution in 1688, that ‘While the FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS is preserved unchecked and uncontrouled, all other liberties, both civil and religious 
will be secured to us under so faithful a guardian.’  And it was also declared by the 
enlightened Virginians, at the commencement of the American revolution, that, ‘The freedom 
of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by 
DESPOTIC governments.’ . . . the liberty of the press should be freely exercised, when 
changes in government are taking place.”). 
 
279
 See generally Charles and O’Neill, Saving the History of the Press Clause from Ruin, 
supra note 10. 
52https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss1/2
2012] THE FACES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 53 
 
press.”280  A free press served to check “arbitrary power” and provide the “easy 
method of conveying the alarm from one end of the kingdom to the other.”281  It 
ensured the “spirit of the people” could be aroused “in order to curb the ambition” of 
government.282   
The South Carolina State Gazette attributed a similar public utility to the press: 
FROM the great utility . . . which every man is enabled to communicate 
his sentiments to the public, and the general concern which matters 
relative to government are always sure to create; a prodigious number of 
publications are continually making their appearance; so as to 
communicate to several measures adopted by administration, as well as 
whatever is advanced by either the advocates or judges, concerned in the 
management and decision of any cause or suit of importance in any court 
of law or equity.  By that means the public are made acquainted with the 
nature of the subject that have been deliberated upon in the assembly of 
their representatives . . . .283 
This public utility is what led to the doctrine against prior restraint.  The 
philosophy being that a constitutional free press served as a self-correcting pendulum 
of truth on matters of public concern such as science, philosophy, politics, and 
government.284  Any actual physical harm associated with the utility could be 
corrected after the fact by the doctrine of libel.  We know this from Blackstone’s 
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Commentaries, which states the origin of libel was to prevent a “breach of the public 
peace, by stirring up the objects of them to revenge, and perhaps to bloodshed.”285  
This fact is confirmed by other eighteenth century jurists.  In 1785, Chief Justice of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Thomas McKean stated that libels are a “breach of 
the public peace, by stirring up the objects of them, their friends and families to acts 
of revenge and perhaps of bloodshed.”286  In 1791, Judge Israel Sumner stated, “The 
true reason, therefore, why the law punishes [libel] criminally, seems to be that it 
tends to create ill blood, and to disturb the publick peace.”287  Meanwhile, in the 
same year Judge Nathaniel Sargeant stated, “The reason why the law criminally 
punishes any libelous publication or writing, is because of its tendency to excite 
revenge, which introduces bloodshed and murder.”288 
Thus, the only common historical denominator that can be drawn between the 
origins of the First and Second Amendments is both could be restricted as a means to 
prevent bloodshed or a breach of the public peace.289  Yet, even this commonality 
maintains an important division as to when the legislature may regulate to prevent 
the breach.  In the case of a free press, punishment occurred after the act due to 
constitutional limitations on prior restraint, and any form of licensing was subject to 
severe scrutiny.  In contrast, armed individual self-defense gave way to the safety of 
the public at large and obtaining a government license for use was never questioned 
in law or history.   
Given these historical facts, it makes little sense to import First Amendment 
jurisprudence into the Second under the auspices that both are individual rights.  If 
the courts are going to take the Second Amendment outside the home seriously, its 
history must first be reconciled to determine what areas are categorically excluded or 
should receive minimal protection.    
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The legal tenets surrounding the Statute of Northampton are part of our Anglo-
American tradition and provide the courts with a historical guidepost in adjudicating 
the Second Amendment outside the home.  History provides us with substantiated 
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evidence that the Statute’s origins derive from the government’s authority to ensure 
public safety, and prevent breaches of the peace such as murder and crime.290  
Indeed, the Statute was adopted during a time of political uncertainty,291 but 
prohibitions on publicly going armed were affirmed by subsequent generations as a 
confirmation of governmental police authority, including the founding generation 
after the adoption of the United States Constitution.292   
There are certainly other approaches the courts may employ when adjudicating 
the Second Amendment outside the home.  These approaches range from a 
libertarian interest balancing approach to importing First Amendment jurisprudence, 
and even rewriting our history altogether through revisionism or a living 
constitution.  While it is at the constitutional discretion of the courts to employ any 
of these latter approaches in creating a standard of review, each poses vexing 
problems if Heller and McDonald’s originalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation is to survive.   
To put it another way, if our Anglo-American tradition is what commanded the 
recognition of the Second Amendment as an individual right, so too must the 
ideological and philosophical restraints on that right.293  This requires more than the 
courts paying lip service to history, and adjudicating the Second Amendment 
according to judicial whims.294  The courts must maintain some sense of historical 
consciousness, for it is “the best means available in an imperfect world.”295  As 
Judge Ilana Rovner eloquently put it in Ezell v. City of Chicago, “If we are to 
acknowledge the historical context and the values of the period when the Second and 
Fourteenth Amendments were adopted, then we must accept and apply the full 
understanding of the citizenry at that time.”296 
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